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     DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION 
JAMES THUO GATHII* 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between corruption and human rights is only 
beginning to be seriously examined.  A major premise of the 
ongoing research argues that corruption disables a state from 
meeting its obligations to respect, fulfill, and protect the human 
rights of its citizens. 
This Article explores two other relationships between human 
rights and corruption.  First, it shows how individualistic and 
procedural rights have been used to defeat investigations and 
prosecutions of corruption by high-level governmental officials.  
Second, it demonstrates how anti-corruption reforms are 
inconsistent with the social and economic rights of the poor and 
marginalized because they have primarily targeted the promotion 
of market efficiency while reducing spending on basic needs and 
rights such as health and education.  These findings are significant 
because they show that the relationship between corruption and 
human rights extends beyond demonstrating that corruption 
disables states from meeting their human rights obligations.  
Indeed, human rights can be used in support of or against 
corruption. 
The thrust of the recommendations made in this Article are 
premised on an approach to human rights that offers the 
maximum potential for the democratization of the Kenyan State 
through transformative constitutional and institutional reforms.  
This can be done by expanding human rights concerns to include 
minority rights and safeguards as well as social and economic 
rights of the poor and marginalized as central agendas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between corruption and economic 
performance is now well understood.  However, the relationship 
between human rights and corruption is much less understood and 
is only beginning to be seriously researched.1  This research project 
contributes to ongoing efforts to understand the relationship 
between corruption and human rights in the Kenyan context. 
Corruption affects human rights in a variety of ways.  For 
example, the rights to food, water, education, health, and the 
ability to seek justice can be violated if a bribe is required to gain 
access to these basic rights.2  Corruption by high-level government 
officials can siphon millions of dollars of the country’s wealth, 
which in turn handicaps the government from fulfilling its duty to 
protect, ensure, and respect the rights guaranteed to its people.  
This relationship between human rights and corruption is 
ambiguous however; while corruption negatively affects human 
rights protection, human rights can help corruption to flourish.3  
This is because human rights and procedural rights, such as due 
process—the right not to have undue delay in court proceedings, 
and the right to a fair trial—can be used by corrupt government 
officials to circumvent and avoid punishment and accountability 
for the role they played in acquiring personal gain for themselves 
at the expense of the people they should be serving. 
                                                     
1 See generally Julio Bacio Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights 
(Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2008) (discussing the 
growing social implications of corruption and its connection to human rights 
violations), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/150/131_terracino 
_en_2008.pdf; Carlos Castresana, Prosecution of Corruption Cases and Respect of 
Human Rights, ¶ 1 (Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, July 27, 
2007) (stating the International Council on Human Rights Policy’s desire to 
further explore the relationship between human rights and corruption), available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/123/131_-_Carlos_Castresana_-_2007.pdf; 
Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the 
Connection 1 (Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2009) 
(discussing the increasing international efforts to address corruption and the 
challenges that exist in combating it), available at http://www.Ichrp.org/files 
/reports/40/131_web.pdf; Transparency Int’l, Human Rights and Corruption 2–3 
(Transparency Int’l, Working Paper No. 05, 2008), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/working_papers/wp 
_2008_0_23_human_rights _corruption [hereinafter Corruption and Human Rights] 
(examining the common links in ideology and goals between human rights and 
international anti-corruption regimes). 
2 See Terracino, supra note 1 (examining the implications which corruption 
may have upon access to basic human rights). 
3 See infra Section 4.6. (Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption Cases). 
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A major reason why the relationship between corruption and 
human rights has been less well understood is because the primary 
impetus of the anti-corruption agenda came from the World Bank 
in light of its mandate in development policy.4  Further, as Section 
3 of this Article shows, from the 1960s to the early 1970s, 
corruption was a backburner issue in bilateral relations between 
developing and developed countries as well as in development 
policy.  In some circles, corruption was argued to be necessary to 
overcome bureaucratic red tape in newly independent countries.  
This began to change as the corrupting influence of multinational 
corporations became the subject of developing country action 
within the United Nations in the mid-1970s.  A proposed code of 
conduct for multinational corporations reflected these concerns.  
However, it was the emergence of the good governance agenda 
sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Bank 
in particular, at the end of the 1980s that brought corruption to the 
center stage of development policy.  Since then, corruption has 
been seen as a major impediment to the success of economic 
reforms. 
In Section 3, this Article will discuss at length how human 
rights fit into the anti-corruption agenda.  Section 3 discusses the 
relationship between human rights and corruption not only 
conceptually but in the Kenyan context as well.  It proceeds from 
the premise that high levels of corruption in a society are likely to 
disable a state from fulfilling its duties to respect and protect the 
human rights of its citizens.5  Section 3 pushes that premise even 
further by arguing that human rights abuses among and between 
individuals in a society are likely to be higher in a country with 
high levels of corruption. 
The discussion in Section 3 confirms the foregoing premises 
through an extensive and contextual discussion of civil and 
political rights, social and economic rights as well as minority 
rights in the Kenyan context.  For example, this Section discusses 
                                                     
4 In fact, Peter Eigen, the founder of the leading global anti-corruption non-
governmental organization, Transparency International, was a manager of World 
Bank Manager programs in Africa and Latin America.  Based on his experiences at 
the World Bank, he founded Transparency International to promote 
accountability and transparency in international development.  See Peter Eigen, 
Founder and Chair of the Board of Advisor of Transparency International, 
available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/4651/27528 
(listing Peter Eigen’s credentials). 
5  See Terracino, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the effects of corruption on the 
health care sector in limiting patient access to healthcare). 
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the importance of freedom of expression in exposing corruption, as 
well as the manner in which the Kenyan government and the 
courts have compromised the ability of a free press to report 
openly about corruption, particularly when it involves senior 
governmental officials.  Section 4 also discusses a trio of recent 
High Court cases, Ng’eny and Saitoti on the one hand, and 
Murungaru on the other.  The first two cases show how the 
judiciary used the protections of Kenya’s Bill of Rights to shield 
government ministers from any prosecutions for engaging in 
corruption.  The courts in these two cases exhibit how the use of a 
merely procedural conception of human rights in the judicial 
system fails to confront the power relations that underlie abuse of 
public resources characterized by corruption.  While the 
Murungaru case somewhat restored hope that the Bill of Rights in 
the Kenyan Constitution would not be used to defend corruption 
suspects, this Article shows the importance of broadening human 
rights to include social and economic rights as well as minority 
rights and safeguards in the anti-corruption context.  Section 4 
shows that such a broad understanding of human rights would 
help in significantly changing the way Kenyan law is implicated in 
producing corruption.  In fact, it demonstrates that it is precisely 
the role that law has played so far that has facilitated the kind of 
impunity with which every Kenyan government without exception 
has engaged in corruption. 
While Section 4 shows how the well-heeled have used the Bill 
of Rights to protect themselves against investigations and 
prosecutions of corruption-related offenses, Section 4.10 shows that 
anti-corruption and attendant judicial reforms have been primarily 
designed to facilitate market reform rather than to be sensitive to 
the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged.  This is problematic 
especially because it is these groups that stand to suffer most when 
their government is corrupt.6  The Article argues that these reforms 
have foreclosed addressing questions of inequality and injustice.  
As such, the Article argues in favor of an anti-corruption agenda 
that is complemented by efforts to address the problems 
confronted by the poor and disadvantaged as a central component 
of the anti-corruption agenda. 
                                                     
6 See infra Section 4.2. (How Corruption Affects the Poor, Marginalized, and 
Disadvantaged). 
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Such an approach would approximate what Upendra Baxi has 
insightfully called “taking suffering seriously.”7  Under such an 
approach, institutional and constitutional reform and 
transformation of the current political arrangements that have 
thrived on corruption would become an integral aspect of the 
struggle for the protection and promotion of human rights.  Used 
effectively, the anti-corruption agenda offers the best opportunity 
to transform the struggle for human rights from its primary 
preoccupation with civil and political rights to focus on social and 
economic rights as well.  That is why an effective anti-corruption 
agenda must be accompanied by broad-based constitutional 
reform to decentralize executive power to make it more 
accountable to Parliament, the Judiciary, and the people.  This 
would in turn require Parliament and the Judiciary to be 
independent so that they could act as effective checks against the 
Executive.  It would also require citizens to be actively involved in 
monitoring these institutions to ensure that they were acting 
consistently with a vision of the social good rather than the 
interests of a select few.8  Finally, it would also require an approach 
to anti-corruption reform that is specifically tailored to the 
particular country in question and not a generic “one plan works 
for every country approach.”9  The final Section of this Article 
summarizes these and other recommendations for reform. 
                                                     
7 See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the 
Supreme Court of India, in LAW AND POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 387 (Upendra Baxi 
ed., 1988) (discussing the background and growing prevalence of social action 
litigation in India as a medium for traditionally disadvantaged and repressed 
groups to seek justice).  See also UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 
(2002) (analyzing the varying images of the character of human rights); Upendra 
Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129 n.11 (1998) (discussing the practice of discursivity and 
its role in creating a civil and political rights regime that is separate and distinct 
from the social, cultural, and economics rights regimes); Willy Mutunga, 
Relational Contract Theory Outside National Jurisdictions (1992) (unpublished 
thesis, on file with Osgoode Hall Law School) (proposing a jurisprudence of basic 
needs for all people). 
8 See WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992–1997, 216 (1999) (examining the 
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change in the context of the community’s 
role in affecting political and constitutional reform in Kenya). 
9 See C. Raj Kumar, Corruption Development and Good Governance: Challenges for 
Promoting Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 475, 509 (2008), for a 
discussion on the significance of considering the importance of both national and 
local variations in cultural, economical, and political factors when considering 
human rights.  See also C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Human Rights, and Development: 
Sovereignty and State Capacity to Good Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 416, 
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2. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM AGENDA: ITS GENESIS IN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
2.1. Introduction 
The contemporary consensus on the necessity of anti-
corruption initiatives in development policy may be taken for 
granted.  It may, for example, be presumed that anti-corruption 
initiatives were and have always been a central tenet of the 
prevailing national and international economic development 
agenda.  This Article argues that this claim is far from true.  Three 
specific arguments are made in the Article to show that the 
contemporary consensus on anti-corruption initiatives 
demonstrates a remarkable departure from prior attitudes towards 
corruption.  The first claim is that bribery of foreign government 
officials has been transformed from being regarded as a necessary 
cost of doing business.  This virtuous view of bribery prevailed 
especially among some economists in the 1960s and early 1970s.  
Today, bribery of foreign government officials is almost 
universally condemned as an economic cost that retards economic 
growth and development.  Second, this Article argues that the 
concerns of developing countries within the United Nations system 
of organizations in the 1960s and 1970s to enact a code of conduct 
for multinational corporations that would have prevented them 
from bribing government officials in their countries has largely but 
not entirely shifted to focus on government officials who take 
bribes.  The third claim in this Article is that as the anti-corruption 
initiatives have become central to national, regional, and 
                                                                                                                        
418 (2005) (examining criticism levied against western countries and NGO’s such 
as the World Bank grounded in charges that their proposals are almost always the 
same without any special consideration given to the specifics of each country, 
different human rights values of that country, or to whether alternative measures 
would be more effective); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and 
Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 503 (1999) 
(discussing the problems that have arisen in countries such as Cambodia when 
the idea of using development to combat corruption has been put into practice);  
World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29 – Apr. 2, 1993, Report of the Regional 
Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993) (“[W]hile human rights are universal in 
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process 
of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds.”). 
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international cooperation on development, there has been less 
attention paid to corruption within the private sector. 
The Article is divided into three parts.  Section 3 examines the 
period between 1960 and 1980.  It examines three distinct 
influences that kept corruption at bay as a critical development 
policy issue.  First, it examines the influence of developed states in 
the 1960s at a moment of hope for newly independent countries 
and the hesitation, based on concepts of cultural relativism, in 
raising the issue of corruption even as it began to become endemic 
in many developing countries towards the end of the 1960s.  The 
second influence that the Article traces is that of economists of the 
period who regarded corruption as a necessary cost of doing 
business in highly regulated countries.  A third influence came 
from the work done in comparative politics which claimed that 
corruption was an indicator of a necessary path towards economic 
and political development much like in the developed world.  In 
Section 4, the Article examines the early origins of anti-corruption 
initiatives in the efforts of developing countries to curb 
multinational corporation bribery within the U.N.  Section 4 also 
examines the efforts of developed countries to come up with a code 
of conduct for multinational corporations in the OECD and the 
United State’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.  This Section 
then proceeds to examine the World Bank’s good governance 
initiative as the first major reflection of an emerging international 
consensus on addressing corruption in developing countries, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  Finally, in Section 5, the author 
examines the modern anti-corruption consensus by examining 
various international and regional initiatives at the inter-
governmental and non-governmental level.  In particular, I focus 
on the manner in which anti-corruption initiatives are heading 
towards linking human rights and constitutionalism as part and 
parcel of the anti-corruption campaign. 
2.2. Setting the Stage for the Emergence of the Anti-Corruption 
Consensus: 1960-1980 
2.2.1. Corruption as a Back-Burner Issue in Bilateral Relations: 
The Cultural Relativist View 
In the 1960s and in the 1970s, corruption within African states 
was often ignored by development economics, western bilateral 
and multilateral donors, and those studying Africa in the West.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Yet, towards the end of the 1960s, it was clear that widespread 
corruption was accompanied by an emerging trend of 
authoritarian, one-party and military rule, economic decline, and 
general political instability in many sub-Saharan African 
countries.10  One of the reasons that accounts for this lack of open 
acknowledgement of corruption, particularly among Africa’s 
bilateral development partners and Westerners studying Africa, 
was that in the immediate post-colonial period many were wary of 
openly criticizing the fledgling governments.  As the Africanist 
L.H. Gann, along with Peter Duignan, lamented regarding the 
1960s, “[w]e were alone in predicting that newly independent 
Africa might have to cope with military coups, corruption, ethnic 
strife, and other afflictions.  The great majority of Africanists, 
particularly in the United States, did not wish to criticize the new 
countries, lest they be regarded as racists.”11  According to Gann 
and Duignan, this conciliatory attitude was to give Africans a 
chance and space to develop without criticism from the West.12  
This was also an era characterized by optimism that Africa would 
develop much like the West without question.13  Hence, Samuel 
Huntington argued: 
In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a 
society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy 
is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy. A 
                                                     
10 See ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK 
AFRICA: PRINCE, AUTOCRAT, PROPHET, TYRANT 17–18 (1982) (“During the past two 
decades, scholars, journalists, and other observers of African affairs have noted 
the recurrence of such phenomena as ‘coups’, ‘plots’, clientelism,’ [and] 
‘corruption’ . . . in numerous African countries . . . . However, as yet there has 
been little inclination to view such phenomena as integral elements of a distinctive 
political system; they are more likely to be seen as merely the defects of an 
otherwise well-established public order.”) (emphasis original).  See e.g. Roberta E. 
McKown, Domestic Correlates of Military Intervention in African Politics, 3 J. POL. & 
MIL. SOC. 191 (1975) (examining the significance of the military coup d’état in 
Africa and its impact on international politics); Amos Perlmutter, The Praetorian 
State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in 
Developing Polities, 1 COMP. POL. 382 (1969) (analyzing the social and political 
factors that contribute to the rise of modern praetorian states, where the military 
has the potential to dominate the nation’s political system). 
11 L.H. Gann, Ex Africa: An Africanist’s Intellectual Autobiography, 31 J. MOD. 
AFR. STUD. 477, 487 (1993). 
12  Id. 
13 See Colin Leys, Confronting the African Tragedy, 204 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 33 
(1994) (noting that the “history of the previous ninety years—i.e., since 1870—
seemed to justify optimism.”). 
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society which is relatively uncorrupt—a traditional society 
for instance where traditional norms are still powerful — 
may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome 
lubricant easing the path to modernization.14 
Consequently, there was less criticism of corruption in this 
early period than perhaps there should have been.  Indeed, it is fair 
to say that two of the countervailing approaches to studying 
African politics and economics at the time—modernization theory 
and dependency theory—similarly avoided corruption issues, 
perhaps in order to put a good face on the African State.  
According to Colin Leys: 
[T]hese . . . schools of thought tended either to have an 
ahistorical approach, or unrealistically short-term 
perspectives. Modernizers were largely uninterested in 
history of any kind, and imagined Africa catching up with 
the west in a generation or two, helped by the advantage of 
having western technology available to them. 
Dependentistas—at least in some cases—imagined some 
kind of alternative path of ‘autocentric’ development, 
following “delinking”; and some Marxists imagined Cuban 
or Chinese-style revolutions. Few theorists of any these 
persuasions expected the post-colonial states of all 
ideological stripes to be corrupt, rapacious, inefficient and 
unstable, as they have almost all been. Most saw these 
things as aberrations, distortions and pathologies, and often 
tended to resort to single-factor or reductionist explanations 
of them. And their hopes have only too deeply 
disappointed.15 
There is still another reason for the reluctance of Africa’s 
bilateral partners today to confront directly the messy politics and 
economic decline of post-colonial rule—The Cold War.16  For the 
                                                     
14  SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968). 
15 Leys, supra note 13 at 41.  See also James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance 
Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and 
Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 
997–1007 (2000) (examining corruption as a limiting force on developmental 
economics of the African state and the modern nationalist view on reforming 
economic and political policies). 
16 See MWALIMU MATI & JOHN GITHONGO, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN KENYA 5 (2001), reprinted in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 
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United States, countries that rejected communism no matter how 
corrupt and dictatorial were considered allies.  For the Soviet 
Union, those countries that embraced communist or approaches to 
governance that rejected the type of market-based approaches 
promoted by the United States were regarded as allies no matter 
their record on political and economic performance.  For both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, democracy and measures such 
as those involved in combating corruption were not as central to 
their foreign policy priorities as were their ideological goals.17 
2.2.2. Corruption as a Necessary Cost of Business – The ‘Virtuous 
Bribery Story’18 
Another factor that contributed to underplaying corruption in 
the 1960s and 1970s was a debate among economists regarding the 
desirability of corruption.  Economists such as Nathaniel Neff 
argued that it was possible for corruption to be beneficial for 
economic growth.19  According to this school of thought, 
developing country governments had developed pervasive and 
inefficient regulations.  Corruption, then, would help circumvent 
these regulations at a low cost because it would reduce uncertainty 
                                                                                                                        
- KENYA: CONTRIBUTION TO THE RULE OF LAW REPORT 2001 OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF JURISTS KENYA SECTION 4 (2001), available at http://www.tikenya 
.org/documents/JudicialDecisions.doc (citing how the politics of the Cold War 
meant that many regimes perceived as thoroughly corrupt—like Kenya’s—
nevertheless did not find their legitimacy challenged seriously as a result of 
corruption). 
17 See WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. 
INTERVENTIONISM AND HEGEMONY 318–19 (1996) (arguing that behind the façade of 
supporting dictatorships to promoting “democratic” regimes, U.S. policy upholds 
the undemocratic status quo of Third World countries). 
18 See Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, 
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 24 (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2048, 1999), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=604923 (“While one may 
think of examples in which some firms/people are made better off either by 
paying a bribe or the opportunity to pay a bribe, the overall effect of corruption on 
economic development is negative.”). 
19 See Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic 
Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 8–14 (1964) (discussing economic efficiency 
virtues of corruption); see also James Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: 
Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption 
Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 425–26 (1999) (discussing how various 
ant-corruption initiatives that form part of the rule of law reforms that donors 
require of public officials in Kenya do not necessarily do not necessarily guarantee 
or entail fair or substantive outcomes). 
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over enforcement.  Hence, while the corrupt officials get bribed, 
allocative efficiency is improved since the official would reward 
the contract at stake to the lowest cost bidder. 
Other scholars argued that corruption was necessary to speed 
up the bureaucratic process or to mediate between political parties 
that could not otherwise reach agreement.  On this view, the bribe 
giver would be better off if the payment of the bribe would result 
in reducing the time that would otherwise have been wasted going 
through circuitous bureaucratic tussles without end.20  This strand 
of research thus stands for the proposition that bribes are virtuous 
since they reduce the deadweight cost of regulatory interventions 
by directing scarce resources toward higher bidders.21 
However, it is equally plausible that corrupt officials may delay 
rather than speed up the administrative process to get more 
bribes.22  According to Shang-Jin Wei, the best claim that can be 
made to this virtuous bribery story is a very narrow one.23  Citing 
prior studies Shang-Jin Wei argues that even when bad regulation 
and official harassment are taken as exogenous, more time is spent 
negotiating with government officials.24  Consequently, he 
concludes that on average, it is more likely that bribery leaves 
society and those paying bribes worse-off in general.  Moreover, 
given that a briber may not be fully informed on the bribing 
capacity of competitors, in considering to offer a bribe, it may turn 
                                                     
20 See Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON. 
760, 760–762 (1985) (discussing how bribery can lead to socially optimal 
solutions). 
21 Id. 
22 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, 2 ASIAN DRAMA 951–952 (1968) (suggesting a possible 
perverse relationship between bureaucratic regulations and bribery); see also Anne 
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 291 
(1974) (arguing that competitive rent-seeking, including bribery, brings additional 
costs to the table).  See generally PETER BAUER, A DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT (1976) 
(departing from the virtuous story of bribery). 
23 See generally Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed 
Up the Wheels of Commerce (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
W7093, 1999), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/grease.pdf (suggesting that bureaucratic 
harassment may be endogenous, and that “firms that pay more bribes are also 
likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating 
regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital”). 
24 Id. 
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out under certain conditions that the lowest-cost firm could still 
win the contract thereby leaving the bribe payer worse off.25 
2.2.3. Corruption as a Necessary Path to Development – 
Comparative Politics 
Studies in comparative politics further buttressed the view that 
corruption was not as economically inimical to growth and 
development in the 1960s and 1970s.  One of the most famous of 
these was Samuel Huntington’s 1968 book, Political Order in 
Changing Societies.26  In that well-known book, Huntington argued 
that: 
Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of 
political participation helps integrate new groups into the 
political system, so also the corruption produced by the 
expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate 
economic development.  Corruption may be one way of 
surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations 
which hamper economic expansion.27 
For Huntington, corruption was as important for purposes of 
national integration as it was for stimulating economic 
development.  He predicated his hope on the false optimism of the 
future of newly independent countries becoming developed as a 
matter of course.  This optimism was buoyed by the fact that the 
United States had experienced speedy growth as a result of similar 
corruption in the 1870s and 1880s particularly at the state level 
with the emerging giant railroad and utility corporations.28  Other 
leading scholars such as Joseph S. Nye29 supported this view, 
                                                     
25 See Paul J. Beck & Michael W. Maher, A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in 
Thin Markets, 20 ECON. LETTERS 1, 5 (1986) (concluding that “there is a fundamental 
isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the 
transaction”); see also Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, A Note on Competitive Bribery Games, 
22 ECON. LETTERS 337 (1986) (“Within a competitive bribery game in which each 
player has incomplete information, we show that there exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium which is symmetric.”). 
26  HUNTINGTON, supra note 14. 
27  Id. at 68. 
28  Id. at 68–69. 
29 See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419–20 (1967) (pointing out that there seem to 
be at least three ways in which some kinds of corruption can promote economic 
development: capital formation, cutting red tape, and entrepreneurship and 
incentives); see also C.J. FREDERICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS: VIOLENCE, 
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giving it further credibility.  Even scholars from a Marxist 
orientation overlooked corruption premising their hopes on 
Africa’s future less to the history of medieval Europe than to the 
‘successful’ economic planning that had turned the Soviet Union 
into a great power within a very short period of time.30 
However, while corruption may have led to the emergence of 
an entrepreneurial class in medieval Europe and in the gilded-age 
era of the United States, corruption did not necessarily lead to the 
same consequences in sub-Saharan Africa.31  As Pranab Bardhan 
argues, in developing countries, corruption feeds upon itself for a 
number of reasons: first, it is beneficial for the payee and the payer; 
second, it is so entrenched that it becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy;32 and third, once corruption takes root in a society it is 
hard to eliminate or win back trust.33  This is a much more nuanced 
understanding of the persistence of corruption since it does not 
presume that a one-time anti-corruption campaign or a simple 
reversal of corrupt behavior will eliminate corruption.34  It does not 
also presume that corruption in societies where it is endemic is 
there to stay.35  This more nuanced understanding informs the 
claim in this Article that anti-corruption measures ought to 
combine human rights and constitutionalism with broad public 
support in order to be effective. 
                                                                                                                        
BETRAYAL, CORRUPTION, SECRECY AND PROPAGANDA 171 (1972) (maintaining that 
where corruption can help to adapt an antiquated or obsolete political order to 
changing conditions, it can be said to be functional). 
30 See James Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance Discourse: 
Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 
65, 81 (1999) (“Other reasons why the newly independent countries in the post-
World War II era rejected free markets as an option included the export 
pessimism experienced in developed countries and the success of the Soviet 
Union which, through economic planning, despite being a relatively 
underdeveloped country, had become a great power in just one generation.”). 
31 See Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1320, 1328–29 (1997) (speculating that perhaps South East Asia 
is an exception to this phenomenon since it has experienced enormous growth 
notwithstanding the presence of corruption); see also ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S 
NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 39–40, 72–73 (1989) 
(discussing how South Korea dealt with corruption). 
32 See John Mulaa, A Sad Case of Kenyans Condoning Corruption, EAST AFRICAN 
STANDARD, August 5, 2007, at 26 (discussing how endemic corruption is in the 
Kenyan context). 
33 Bardhan, supra note 31, at 1330–35. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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3. THE EMBRYONIC STAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION CONSENSUS 
3.1. Developing Country Focus on Corruption within the United 
Nations 1960-1990 
The newly independent countries of Asia and Africa combined 
with Latin American and other developing countries to form a 
solid majority within the United Nations in the post-World War II 
era with a view to reforming the international political economy 
favourably towards them.36  By such an agenda, these countries 
hoped to, among other things, undo what they perceived to be the 
unfair concessions entered into by predecessor colonial regimes 
and recalibrate rules of trade, finance, and commerce to attain 
fairer and advantageous bargains in ways that respected 
sovereignty over their natural resources.37 
Controlling corrupt payments to officials in these countries by 
multinational corporations was a central aspect of these initiatives.  
At the end of the 1960s, there was widespread evidence of big 
multinational corporations such as I.T.T., Lockheed, United 
Brands, Mobil, Exxon, and E.R. Squibb, giving huge bribes in a 
variety of countries.38  The thrust of the concerns expressed by 
                                                     
36 See James Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184, 
203–05 (1996) (surveying various scholarly viewpoints on Third World countries’ 
failed attempt to restructure international relations by establishing an equilibrium 
between their raw-material-producing economies and Western industrial service-
oriented economies); see also James Gathii, The Limits of the New International Rule 
of Law on Good Governance, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 218–31 (Edward Quashigah & Obiora 
Okafor eds., 1999) (discussing  macro-economic reform in the new international 
rule of law as well as the role of public international legal scholarship in defeating 
a joint third world agenda and its New International Economic Order proposal). 
37 For an early view, see Subhash C. Jain, Legal ‘Dichotomy’ of Concessions, 9 
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 512 (1969), where the author distinguishes between pre-
independence and post-independence concessions and concludes that the former 
are voidable due to the fact that the states on which they are imposed did not 
actively participate in their adoption.  For a later well-known view, see 
MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979), 
for a discussion on changes in international order and law, such as decolonization 
and the deterioration of terms of trade, which precipitated the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order. 
38 See Peter W. Schroth, Constitutional Aspects of the Proposed African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 7–8 (Feb. 24, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroth, Constitutional 
Aspects] (noting specific cases of foreign bribery admitted by American 
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developing countries hinged on an affirmation of their sovereignty 
through the aspiration to control the influence of multinational 
corporations within their countries.  The extreme manifestation of 
this aspiration was prompted by the financial involvement of I.T.T. 
in the plot to remove leftist Chilean President Allende and to 
replace him with General Pinochet who favoured the interests of 
foreign investors such as I.T.T.39 
Indeed, the 1976 Declaration of the Heads of States at the 5th 
Conference of the Non-Aligned States took issue with 
multinational corporate corruption as “motivated by exploitative 
profits” and exhausting third world resources while distorting 
these economies.40  According to this Declaration, these practices 
constituted violations of these countries rights to self-
determination and non-intervention.41  Developing countries 
therefore combined their majorities in the United Nations to pass 
resolutions condemning the corrupt practices of multinational 
corporations.42  In 1974, a United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations was also established to formulate the 
major principles and issues involved in formulating a Code of 
Conduct for transnational corporations.43  The spirit behind 
formulating a Code of Conduct was inspired by the 1974 General 
Assembly resolution on the Declaration of a New International 
Economic Order (“NIEO”).44  The NIEO was the climactic moment 
for developing countries in their quest to reform the international 
political economy favorably towards them.  Paragraph 4 of the 
                                                                                                                        
corporations during the Securities and Exchange Commission’s corruption 
hearings in the 1970s); S.K. Verma, International Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations, 20 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 20, 20–23 (1980) (focusing on payoffs made by 
transnational corporations in the context of the role that transnational 
corporations play in undermining host countries’ fiscal and monetary policies). 
39 Verma, supra note 38 at 20 n.3. 
40 1976 Declaration of the Heads of States, 5th Conference of the Non-Aligned 
States, Economic Declaration, reprinted in 27 REV. INT’L AFF. 31, 35 (1976). 
41 Id. 
42 E.g., G.A. Res. 3514, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess. (Dec. 15, 1975) 
(condemning all corrupt practices by corporations that violate the laws and 
regulations of host countries). 
43 U.N. Comm’n on Transnational Corporations, Intergovernmental Working 
Group on the Code of Conduct, Report on the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.10/31 (May 4, 1977) (prepared by Sten Miklasson), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 
709 (1977). 
44 See G.A. Res. 3201, at 3, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/9559 (May 1, 1974) (aiming to alleviate the imbalance between developing and 
developed countries and to promote economic and social progress and peace). 
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Declaration entitled developing countries to have regulatory 
authority over the activities of transnational corporations.  The 
spirit of the NIEO was reinforced by the U.N. Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States.45 
Ultimately, the NIEO agenda was deadlocked at the United 
Nations.  Western industrialized countries, particularly the U.S., 
rejected it.46  The promise of a code of conduct of multinational 
corporations languished in the U.N. throughout the 1970s, but by 
the beginning of the 1980s, changing views on the causes of lack of 
economic growth in developing countries overshadowed the focus 
on the corrupting influence of multinational corporations.  
Attitudes had begun to shift towards corruption within countries 
experiencing endemic corruption rather than on external causes of 
corruption and lack of growth, such as the activities of 
transnational corporations. 
3.2. Developed Country Focus on Corruption within the OECD 1969-
1990 
While developing countries used the United Nations system to 
pursue anti-corruption strategies, developed country governments 
pursued these initiatives within the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation, (“OECD”), a standard setting 
organization of the economic cooperation between European 
countries and the United States.  Similar to United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions, the Declarations of the OECD are voluntary 
and therefore are not legally enforceable.47 
                                                     
45 See G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR 29th Sess. (Dec. 12, 1974) 
(proclaiming that each State had the right to regulate transnational corporations 
within its jurisdiction and to fully exercise sovereignty over its wealth, natural 
resources, and economic activities). 
46 Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, supra note 36. 
47 Some scholars have, however, argued that voluntary codes such as the 
Basel Accords are the most significant source of norms in international law today 
and their influence on norms and state/non-state behavior ought not to be 
understated.  For more, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International 
Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 (2000), for an argument that a liberal 
approach to international law recognizes various types of lawmaking that exist at 
the individual, governmental, and state levels; and see Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 177 (Michael Byers ed., 2000), for a discussion on the 
increasing role that participation in international regulatory organizations such as 
the Basel Committee and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissioners play in allowing States to regulate an increasingly global 
economy. 
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For example, in its 1976 Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the OECD encouraged 
multinational corporations to minimize problems in their relations 
in developing countries by focusing on making positive economic, 
social, and environmental contributions in these countries.48  The 
guidelines specified that multinational corporations ought to 
refrain from paying bribes or other improper payments to public 
officials.  They also called on these corporations not to make 
contributions to holders of political office, contenders for such 
office, or political parties.49  For purposes of enforcement, the 
Guidelines recommended annual publication of the financial 
activities of such corporations as well as compliance with the 
national laws and policies of the host countries.50 
3.3. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 1977-1989 
It was not until the U.S. Congress became actively involved in 
the embryonic stages of the international anti-bribery movement 
that it began to grow teeth and credibility.  Congressional attention 
was spurred by revelations and acknowledgements that American 
corporations were involved in giving bribes to foreign government 
officials in return for procuring contracts or as sales commissions.51  
Congressional attention was driven in part by the attention created 
by the Watergate scandal52 and by virtue of the fact that the 
payments to foreign government officials by U.S. multinational 
                                                     
48 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev [OECD]., OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 14 (2008), available at http://oecd.org/dataoecdx561 
/361922428.pdf. 
49 Id. at 21. 
50 Id. at 14–15. 
51 See Repeal of Laws Aiding Multinationals Sought, 34 CONG. Q. 1026, 1026 
(1976) (indicating that as of April 23, 1976, approximately eighty-four companies 
had admitted to bribing foreign officials to win new contracts); Michael E. 
Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National Responsibility, 62 A.B.A. 
J. 480, 480 (1976) (reporting that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
investigation indicated that American companies are commonly associated with 
bribery and improper payments in developing countries where such practices are 
commonplace); Peter Nehemkis, Business Payoffs Abroad: Rhetoric and Reality, 18 
CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 5 (1975) (noting the types of bribes paid by top American 
companies operating overseas to obtain decisions from host governments that 
would result in favorable business conditions); Schroth, supra note 38, 6–7. 
52 Schroth, supra note 38, at 6–7. 
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corporations were benefiting from tax exemptions enacted by 
Congress.53 
The high profile attention given to this issue is exemplified by 
the appointment of a Special Presidential Task Force headed by a 
cabinet member to study the problem in late March 197654  and a 
special study issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) on the problem.55  Several congressional hearings were 
also held and bills on the issue were proposed in the second 
Congressional session of 1976.56  The SEC Report emphasized that 
corrupt payments were adversely affecting public confidence in 
American business.57  The SEC’s recommendations focused on 
eliminating corrupt payments through express prohibition and 
penalization as well as provided requirements for transparent and 
honest internal auditing in accord with generally recognized 
accounting principles.58  The Presidential Task Force’s 
recommendations called for legislation requiring these 
corporations to meet disclosure requirements only with regard to 
material information.59  Unlike the SEC, the Presidential 
Commission excluded from its recommendations the 
                                                     
53 See generally Ronald P. Kane & Samuel Butler III, Improper Corporate 
Payments: The Second Half of Watergate, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 17–21 (1976) (providing 
an extensive history of the improper foreign payments made by Gulf Oil 
Corporation and United Brands). 
54 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminal Prosecution of United States Multinational 
Corporations, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 485 (1977) (noting that the SEC prepared a 
report to study corrupt payment in general and the President Task Force prepared 
a report to study the specific problem of bribes to foreign officials). 
55 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH 
CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE 
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 
SEC REPORT] (reporting the findings of the SEC study to determine the nature and 
extent of questionable or illegal foreign payments and the potential effect such 
activity will have on the U.S. economy); THE CARTER CENTER OF EMORY UNIVERSITY, 
PERESTROIKA WITHOUT GLASNOST IN AFRICA 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE CARTER 
CENTER] (discussing rising trends in innovative economic policies and how those 
policies provoke challenges to political regimes) (quoting Michael Lofchie who 
participated in the inaugural meeting at the Carter Center). 
56 See Hermann, supra note 54, at 484–97 (outlining Congressional proposals 
to deal with bribery and corruption). 
57 See SEC REPORT, supra note 55, at 54 (concluding that the commission found 
that the problem of questionable and illegal corporate payments is cause for a 
deep concern). 
58 See Hermann, supra note 54, at 491–92 (comparing the recommendations of 
the studies prepared by the SEC and the Presidential Task Force). 
59 Id. at 492. 
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criminalization of payment of foreign government officials.60  It 
was in this context, that Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977. 
3.4. The World Bank’s Good Governance Initiative:  1989 Onward 
In the 1990s, the term, “governance,” became widely accepted 
as “a guiding principle to advance the conceptualization of 
contemporary African political processes.”61  This report 
inaugurated a new way of examining Africa’s economic and 
political problems.  According to this new view, bad governance 
lies at the heart of poor economic and political performance in 
postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa.  Under this view, corruption is 
one of the indicators of bad governance.62 
Within the good governance agenda, either orthodox structural 
adjustment or macroeconomic reform and stabilization are the 
primary objective.  These reforms are aimed at increasing the 
productive capacities of the private sector as the engine of 
economic growth, or releasing market forces from the clutches of 
regulatory controls.  Releasing market forces within this 
framework is premised on the protection and enforcement of the 
private rights of property and freedom of contract and exchange by 
using a system of public law.  There are at least two major roles 
assigned to public law and policy, the first to protect private 
property against re-distributive interventionism and the second to 
enforce contracts. 
An important aspect of good governance programs is 
identifying orthodox macroeconomic reform as imperative to sub-
Saharan Africa reform.  Thus, the good governance agenda is 
focused on ensuring that sub-Saharan African economies lack the 
institutional, political, and administrative mechanisms to support 
orthodox macro-economic reform.  Corruption has been identified 
                                                     
60 Id. 
61 See THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting Michael Lofchie who 
observed that governance better “enables us to range widely to determine 
precisely where effective control of African societies lies.  Governance does not 
prejudge the locus or character of real decisional authority.”). 
  61  
62 See DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS VII: AGGREGATE AND 
INDIVIDUAL GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 1996–2007 7–8 (2008) (describing “control of 
corruption” as a measurement in “perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”). 
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as a major part of the institutional, administrative and political 
problems inhibiting the success of macroeconomic reform.63  
Transparency and accountability therefore are an important part of 
the anti-corruption initiatives of the good governance agenda.64  
Reforms aimed at de-regulating, liberalizing and privatizing the 
economies of developing countries have also become central to 
combating corruption.65 
3.5. An International Consensus Emerges:  Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
as Central to Development Policy 
By the mid-1990s, a consensus emerged placing corruption at 
the center of development policy.  Consequently, the World Bank 
concluded in its 1997 World Development Report that without an 
effective state, “sustainable development, both economic and 
social, is impossible.”66  Corruption is now seen as detrimental to 
both economic growth67 and private investment.68 
                                                     
63 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 4–5 (1992) (discussing 
World Bank’s role in addressing economic reform and nurturing political 
consensus for reforms); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S 
EXPERIENCE, vii–ix (1994) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S 
EXPERIENCE] (concluding that “[g]ood governance is epitomized by predicable, 
open, and enlightened policy-making . . . ; a bureaucracy imbued with a 
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs”). 
64 GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE, supra note 63, at vii–ix 
(discussing accountability of economic and social dimensions of governance to 
produce change). 
65 See Gathii, supra note 19, at 407 (providing an overview of anti-corruption 
initiatives that rule of law donors have required the Kenyan government to 
implement). 
66 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1 (1997).  See also Press Release, 
IMF Interim Committee, Interim Committee Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable 
Global Growth (Sept. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Declaration on Partnership], available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/dec.pdf. 
67 See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 683 (1995) 
(finding that corruption lowers levels of private investment and economic 
growth); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611 
(1993) (acknowledging that most studies suggest “existing corruption levels are 
detrimental to development.”); Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public 
Investment, and Growth (INT’L MONETARY FUND, Working Paper No. 97/139, Oct. 
1997) (reviewing five channels through which corruption lowers economic 
growth). 
68 See Alberto Alesina et al., Political Instability and Economic Growth (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4173, 1992) (concluding that in 
“countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, 
growth is significantly lower than otherwise”). 
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Even the IMF, which had initially been reluctant to embrace the 
good governance agenda as being too political and outside its 
strictly economic mandate, eventually embraced it in the mid-
1990s.69  In September 1996, the IMF Board of Governors adopted a 
Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth, which 
emphasized the importance of “[p]romoting good governance in 
all its aspects, specifying the need for rule of law, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling 
corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which 
economies can prosper.”70  Furthermore, in 1997, the IMF’s Board 
of Governors adopted a guidance note, Good Governance—The 
IMF’s Role, which sought to promote greater attention to 
governance issues.  The guidance note called for a proactive 
advocacy of policies promoting good governance issues within the 
Fund’s mandate and expertise such as the proper “management of 
public resources (including sales of public assets), and the 
development and maintenance of a transparent economic and 
regulatory environment conducive to private sector activity.”71  In 
February 2001, the IMF Executive Board evaluated the 1997 
Guidance Note in a staff paper, Review of the Fund’s Experience in 
Governance Issues.72  In addition to endorsing the Fund’s evolving 
approach in dealing with the issue of governance, the paper 
stressed that corruption prevention should be the centerpiece of 
the IMF’s governance strategy. 
                                                     
69 See Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited By Articles of 
Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 12 IMF SURVEY 
146, 146–147 (1983) (commenting that because political considerations are not 
completely isolated from economic ones, it may be appropriate for the IMF to 
develop policies to help member nations achieve their social and political 
objectives if those objectives if the economic consequences of those objectives are 
consistent with IMF’s purposes); See also James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a 
Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in 
International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 147–63 (1999) (discussing the 
World Bank’s implementation of good-governance incentive programs). 
70 Declaration on Partnership, supra note 66, at 1. 
71 Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane, Afr. Dep’t, IMF, Speech on Governance at the 
Africa Development Bank Symposium on New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (May 27, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np 
/speeches/2002/052702a.htm. 
72 See Pol’y Dev. & Rev. Dep’t., Int’l Monetary Fund, Review of Funds 
Experience in Governance Issues (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external 
/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm (discussing the IMF’s initiatives to promote 
good governance). 
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The World Bank has developed six aggregate indicators to 
evaluate the quality of governance in a country and the control of 
corruption.  The measurement uses as an indicator the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand corruption.  The other indicators are voice and 
accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law.73  
World Bank data shows that countries with vibrant democracies, 
such as Portugal, Chile, and Canada have very little corruption.  By 
contrast, countries with little voice and accountability, like 
Zimbabwe, tend to have more corruption.74 
4. HOW DOES HUMAN RIGHTS FIT INTO THE ANTI -CORRUPTION 
AGENDA? 
4.1. Introduction 
Section 3 showed that corruption emerged as a governance 
concern in the Bretton Woods institutions rather than as a human 
rights concern within the human rights bodies of the United 
Nations.  This Section therefore locates corruption within the 
framework of international human rights.  It does so in the specific 
context of Kenya although the human rights issues canvassed are 
challenges in many similar countries.  This Section begins with a 
conceptual overview of the relationship between corruption and 
human rights in the Kenyan context.  It focuses on issues relating 
to freedom of expression as it relates to anti-corruption initiatives.  
It discusses several judicial opinions interpreting a variety of 
freedom of expression issues such as press freedom and libel as 
they relate to corruption.  It also discusses a variety of social and 
economic rights as they relate to corruption in the country as well 
                                                     
73 WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, A DECADE OF MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE: 
GOVERNANCE MATTERS 2006: WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, 9–12 (2006) 
[hereinafter QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE]; Kaufman, supra note 62, at 7–8. 
74 See QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 73, at 7 (elaborating on the link 
between “the idea that when citizens can demand more accountability through 
the ballot box, or where there is freedom of expression, of the media, and of 
information, governments become cleaner and less corrupt”); Melissa A. Thomas, 
What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?, Oct., 2006, available at 
http://www.cityindicators.org/Deliverables/Measuring%20Governance_1-2        
-2007-836890.pdf (providing critique of what worldwide governance indicators 
really measure). 
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as the separation of powers issues that have hobbled the anti-
corruption agenda in the country.  This Section demonstrates that 
it is really those who stand to lose most from the exposure of 
corruption who are likely to defend and vindicate their rights in 
the judiciary.  Thus, while rights are important in exposing 
corruption, in the context of Kenya, they have often been used to 
override the full implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in 
the country.  The section ends with ideas on how to transform the 
anti-corruption agenda utilizing rights. 
4.2. Corruption and Human Rights Conceptually and in the Kenyan 
Context 
The protection of human rights is inversely affected by the 
presence of corruption in a society.75  This means that high levels of 
corruption in a society are likely to disable a state from fulfilling its 
duties to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of its 
citizens.76  Some international organizations, including the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights, have even gone so far as 
to consider corruption a “crime against humanity.”77  This is due to 
the undermining effect corruption has on the ability of a state to 
comply with its human rights obligations—it erodes both the 
state’s capacity to and the public’s confidence that the state will 
deliver services to the public.78 
Since corruption depletes resources available for public 
spending, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has argued that corruption prohibits a state from 
taking steps to maximize “its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.”79  Moreover, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
                                                     
75 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) (taking the view that corruption is adversely 
related to the realization of human rights). 
76 Id. 
77 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 23. 
78 See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights and the Gov’t of Pol., 
U.N. Conf. on Anti-Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights, 
Background Note, ¶ 3, HR/POL/GG/SEM/2006/2 (Nov. 8–9, 2006) [hereinafter 
Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures] (acknowledging that elements of the U.N. 
human rights system have commented on the inability of states to comply with 
their obligations as a result of corruption). 
79 Id. ¶ 6. 
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noted that corruption has a negative effect on Kenya’s 
implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child.80 
Corruption not only depletes resources that might otherwise be 
spent on essential public functions: 
[C]orrupt management of public resources compromises 
the Government’s ability to deliver an array of services, 
including health, educational and welfare services, which 
are essential for the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights.  Also, the prevalence of corruption creates 
discrimination in access to public services in favour of those 
able to influence the authorities to act in their personal 
interest, including by offering bribes.  The economically 
and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately 
from the consequences of corruption, because they are 
particularly dependent on public goods.81 
In addition, in a society with a high incidence of corruption as 
well as a lack of aggressive efforts to hold those responsible 
accountable, one would also anticipate a high prevalence of human 
rights abuse at the horizontal level.82  That is to say, human rights 
                                                     
80 See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kenya, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.160 
(Nov. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Concluding Observations] (attributing partial 
responsibility for the difficulties impeding the implementation of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child to the rampant corruption within Kenya).  See also 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: Tajikistan, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.136 (Oct. 23, 2000) 
(noting the difficulties which corruption has posed to the implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in Tajikistan); Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Georgia, ¶ 
18–19, U.N. Doc CRC/C/15/Add.124 (June 28, 2000) (stating that corruption has 
negatively affected the ability of Georgia to allocate budgetary resources in favor 
of children to the level required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child); 
Terracino, supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing many of the rights of a child that may be 
violated due to corruption). 
81 Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 78, ¶ 6; see also Concluding 
Observations, supra note 80, ¶ 9, for a discussion regarding the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child’s acknowledgment that corruption has a negative effect on the 
implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child with reference to 
Kenya. 
82 While states have the primary responsibility to ensure internationally and 
constitutionally guaranteed rights are protected, respected, and fulfilled, private 
actors—including individuals—have obligations not to violate human rights.  The 
duties individuals have regarding human rights are recognized in Part I, Chapter 
II of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, which Kenya has signed 
and ratified.  See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, pt. 1, ch. 
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abuses among and between individuals in a society with high 
levels of corruption are likely to be high.83  The Waki Commission 
reinforced the link between corruption and violence, on the one 
hand, and the egregious violations of human rights that have 
accompanied elections in Kenya since 1992, on the other hand.84  
By contrast, countries where respect for human rights is high are 
unlikely to experience a high prevalence of corruption.  This is 
supported by rankings in Transparency International’s annual 
Corruption Perception Index for 2008.85 
                                                                                                                        
2, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5 (June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 58.  Article 27, for 
example, provides that every “individual shall have duties towards his family and 
society” as well as the State and other “legally recognized communities.”  Id. pt. 1, 
ch. 2, art. 27.  Article 29(4) obliges the individual to “preserve and strengthen 
social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened.”  Id. pt. 1, 
ch. 2, art. 29(4).  As such, individuals who killed others, who took part in planning 
to cause chaos, or who gave their support in aid of those that caused the violence 
acted inconsistently with Article 27 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights.  See Id. pt. 1, ch. 2, art. 27 (proclaiming the obligatory duties of every 
individual toward society, the state, and other legally recognized communities, 
and requiring that the rights and freedoms of every individual be exercised with 
respect toward the rights of others, collective security, morality, and the common 
interest). 
83 A good Kenyan example of this is the large pyramid scheme perpetrated on 
Kenyans by Kenyans in 2007 in which 2.4–2.6 million shillings were invested by 
Kenyan people in a company promising huge returns on the investment (upwards 
of 300%), promises which the owners knew to be false and which they never 
intended to repay.  See Woman Denies Sh2.4m Pyramid Scheme Fraud, DAILY NATION 
(Nairobi), June 14, 2007, at 7 and Lucas Barasa & Jeff Otieno, Victims of Pyramid 
Schemes Speak Out, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), July 4, 2007, at 4–5 for a more detailed 
description of such schemes.  While there is no apparent government 
involvement, a lack of accountability and the ability to redress grievances has 
made it difficult for the victims to get their money back.  Despite government 
orders not to allow money to be withdrawn, corrupt bank managers are still 
allowing the perpetrators to withdraw money made from the pyramid scheme. 
84 See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON POST ELECTION VIOLENCE, REPORT ON POST-
ELECTION VIOLENCE 444 (2008) [hereinafter WAKI COMMISSION REPORT] (“[T]he 
elements of systemic and institutional deficiencies, corruption, and entrenched 
negative socio-political culture, have in our view, caused and promoted impunity 
in this country.”), available at http://www.eastandard.net/downloads 
/Waki_Report.pdf.  See also Patricia Nyhan & Helen Epstein, Kenya’s Unfinished 
Democracy: A Human Rights Agenda for the New Government, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, 
Dec. 2008, at 5–6, 15–16 [hereinafter Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy] for a 
description of the violence and human rights violations occurring during the 1992 
and 1997 Kenyan presidential elections. 
85 See Transparency Int’l, 2008 Corruption Perception Index (2008) (assigning all 
countries a Corruption Perception Index score and ranking them based upon the 
levels of corruption within each country as they are perceived by various business 
people and country analysts surveyed by Transparency International). 
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Anti-corruption initiatives fall within the rubric of good 
governance.  The good governance agenda is mutually reinforcing 
and overlapping with the values embodied in national and 
international human rights instruments.  For example, the anti-
corruption measures aimed at achieving transparency and 
accountability86 that give individuals the right to expose 
wrongdoing simultaneously promote the realization of the right to 
freedom of expression.  Furthermore, an atmosphere in which 
rights are generally respected is likely to be one in which 
individuals are free to report incidents of corruption and, 
therefore, one that enables activism against corruption.  This is 
why the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(“UNCAC”) requires that states enact so-called “Whistleblower 
Laws” to ensure the protection of those who come forward and 
expose governmental corruption.87  Unfortunately, whistleblowers 
in Kenya all too often forfeit their jobs, health, or lives for exposing 
egregious incidents of corruption.88  Such consequences are due, in 
part, to the all too lenient Kenyan laws in place for the protection 
of whistleblowers.89  The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
(“KACC”) has called for the repeal and revision of these laws 
because, although the harassment and/or intimidation of 
whistleblowers is prohibited, the law does not have any penalty or 
punishment in place for those who choose to break the law.  Even 
the “KACC [has] no powers to arrest and prosecute the 
offenders.”90 
                                                     
86 Examples here include rules extending protection for whistleblowers. 
87 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 40–41 (noting that 
failure to enact such laws leaves  “witnesses and victims unprotected[,] 
encourages corrupt practices and impunity, and discourages witnesses from 
fulfilling a public responsibility.”) 
88 See, e.g., Fred Mukinda, Murder Police Squad on the Loose, DAILY NATION 
(Nairobi), Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056 
/534982/-/view/printVersion/-/151ym2z/-/index.html (claiming that “Kenya’s 
ability to protect whistle blowers is in question following the officer’s shooting”); 
Press Release, Office of Public Communications (Kenya), Whistleblowers Security 
Enhanced, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.communication.go.ke/news.asp?id=106 
(noting that whistleblowers “are sometimes threatened with either murder or 
violence or both, [and] risk employer retaliation that could lead to job dismissal, 
demotion, transfer, no promotion, and no assignment of duties”). 
89 See Amos Kareithi, KACC Stands up for Whistleblowers, EAST AFRICAN 
STANDARD, Aug. 22, 2007, at 9 (quoting the Kenya Anti-Corruption Committee as 
saying that the Witness Protection Act of 2006 “is not enough to protect witnesses 
in graft cases.”). 
90 Id. 
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 4.3. Freedom of Expression 
Corruption flourishes in countries that limit public knowledge 
about the manner in which governments and actors in the private 
sector make decisions.91  The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption has even gone so far as to outline a list of categories of 
information that a government should make public.92  This list 
includes:  management of public finances, hiring of public officials, 
public administration, and general decision-making processes in 
the government.93  Such items are included because a lack of 
information about the criteria a government uses to make 
budgetary allocations for health and education does not promote 
openness.  In addition, when those allocations reveal favor towards 
some regions of a country and disfavor toward others, without the 
opportunity and freedom to question such allocations, corruption 
has the perfect opportunity to thrive.  Further, corruption is likely 
to thrive when the criteria for awarding government contracts or 
selling government property are vague and such transactions are 
undertaken without providing information about such criteria to 
the public. 
In short, “information in the control of public authorities is a 
valuable public resource and . . . public access to such information 
promotes greater transparency and accountability of those public 
authorities.”94  As such, when citizens have access to information 
about how and why their government and private sector actors 
make decisions that affect them, there is greater room for 
transparency and accountability. 
                                                     
91 See Kumar, Corruption Development, supra note 9, at 491–96, for a detailed 
example of this phenomenon in Japanese society. 
92 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 13 (identifying various 
categories of information which a government should make public in order to 
fight corruption and ensure effective government accountability). 
93 Id. 
94  TRANSPARENCY INT’L, USING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AS AN ANTI-
CORRUPTION TOOL, 5 (2006), available at http://www.transparency.org 
/publications/publications/right2know (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  One area in Kenya where the citizens have been grossly uninformed is 
in the area of voting and voters’ rights.  Ms. Koki Muli has said that many 
politicians distribute money, food items, or both in exchange for votes and the 
Kenyan people have never been informed that this is illegal and that these bribes 
should not be accepted.  See Susan Anyangu, Bribery of Voters Condemned, EAST 
AFRICAN STANDARD, July 16, 2007, at 10. 
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The foregoing principles hold largely true in Kenya.  
Corruption thrived in Kenya, especially following the systematic 
dismantling of the rule of law and tenets of good governance 
during the one-party era in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, corruption 
continued to thrive as significant economic reforms were 
implemented in the absence of legal restraints against corruption.  
Momentous transfers of wealth occurred in secrecy as public 
corporations were privatized and fell into the hands of powerful 
and highly connected individuals within the Moi government.  
Thus, when a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the murder of 
Robert Ouko—who was, at the time of his murder, the Kenyan 
Minister for Foreign Affairs—began revealing high-stakes 
corruption among those close to President Daniel arap Moi, the 
government disbanded the Commission in order to foreclose 
more revelations.95  In addition, when civil society groups began 
exposing corruption through documentation, President Daniel Moi 
extended his repression to such groups.  As such, in 1995, the Moi 
government banned a non-governmental organization, the Center 
for Law and Research International (Clarion), which had published 
an early report on corruption in Kenya. 
4.4. Why Freedom of Expression is Important 
Effective strategies for combating corruption depend on the 
ability to expose corruption in the first place.  Freedom of 
expression is an important prerequisite for encouraging a “political 
culture that encourages, nurtures and reinforces exposure and 
punishment” of corruption.96  Respect for freedom of expression 
also leads to exposure of the causes and consequences of 
corruption and an atmosphere within which anti-corruption 
                                                     
95 See Aidan Hartley, A Political Murder, AFR. REP., May–June 1990, at 17–20 
(discussing the murder of Minister Ouko, the political climate in Kenya at the 
time, and the ensuing government efforts to repress dissent); Robert I. Rotberg, 
U.S. Should Push Kenya’s Moi Toward Genuine Reform, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Dec. 5, 1991, at 19 (examining President Moi’s corrupt practices and his possible 
involvement in the death of Minister Ouko). 
96 ANYANG’ NYONG’O, A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE: A VISION FOR KENYA’S SOCIO-
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 91 (2007); See Kumar, Corruption 
Development, supra note 9, at 491–96, for a discussion regarding how the Japanese 
context provides a striking example of this phenomenon.  While Japan is one of 
the more developed nations in the world, it still greatly struggles to curb 
governmental corruption, particularly within the legislature, due in large part to 
the press not freely exposing corruption. 
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strategies can be pursued.97  The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights98 and the Constitution of Kenya guarantee the 
right to hold opinions and to express them without any 
interference.99  This right includes the freedom to impart, to seek 
and to receive information and ideas of all kinds, in any form or 
medium, without interference by the government or private 
parties. 
While times have changed, Kenyan governments from colonial 
times to the present have imposed heavy-handed measures 
limiting the printing, publication and distribution of information 
that dared expose corruption in government.  Magazines such as 
Nairobi Law Monthly, Society and Finance were banned, their editors 
jailed and the printing presses they used were raided and often 
destroyed.100  Even as recently as 2003, the then newly elected 
Kibaki government raided the printing presses of a leading 
newspaper after it published information critical of the 
government.  In the same year, Attorney General Amos Wako 
raised newspaper and magazine registration and bond fees by high 
margins, a move publishers of alternative newspapers—who were 
often unafraid to expose high level corruption—alleged was aimed 
at putting them out of business and stifling expression.101  
                                                     
97 See generally Helen Darbishire, The Rights of Access to Information in Fighting 
Corruption—A Human Rights Perspective (July 28, 2007) (unpublished paper 
prepared for the International Council on Human Rights Policy, Review Meeting 
on Corruption and Human Rights) (examining how the right to information, and 
government efforts to protect that right, leads to the exposure and prevention of 
corruption), available at http://www.ichrp.org/en/search?q=Helen+Darbishire 
(follow “Right to Information as a Tool to Combat Corruption” link). 
98 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Mar. 23, 
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (decreeing a universal right to freedom of 
opinion and expression). 
99 Section 79(1) of the Constitution provides:  
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold 
opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information 
without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information 
without interference (whether the communication be to the public 
generally or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from 
interference with his correspondence.  
CONSTITUTION, Art. 79(1) (2008) (Kenya). 
100 See James Thuo Gathii, Freedom of Expression Without a Free Press: An 
Inquiry Into a Kenyan Paradox (1995) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law 
School) (on file with author). 
101 See COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, ATTACKS ON THE PRESS 2003: KENYA 
(2004), available at http://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-kenya.php 
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Fortunately, in a decision on October 3rd, 2008 dealing with the 
dismissal of a defamation case, the High Court noted that large 
damage awards in some defamation cases were “not founded on a 
clearly demonstrable basis of compensation for [the] injury 
suffered” and were, therefore, a clear departure from Court of 
Appeals’ precedent.102 
In October 2003, the minister in charge of security, Chris 
Murungaru, in justifying the arrest and detention for three days of 
a journalist and for six hours of two others, argued that journalists 
are not above the law and that these arrests and detention were in 
Kenya’s national security interests.  This statement ominously 
hearkened back to the regrettable, dark days of press repression 
under single-party rule in Kenya.  In the 1980s and 1990s, President 
Moi used national security as a rationale to heavily restrict the 
press’s freedom.  Such repression was justified on the premise that 
Section 79(2) of the Constitution, which enables the government to 
limit freedom of expression in the public interest.103  The judiciary 
in turn developed jurisprudence deferential to the government’s 
authority to limit the press’s freedom in the public interest.  In all 
these instances, the harassment, unjustified arrest and prosecution 
of journalists—often on trumped up charges—effectively led to the 
infringement of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression and 
information.104 
                                                                                                                        
(reporting that Wako “raised the libel insurance bond that publishers must pay 
the government from 10,000 Kenyan shillings (U.S. $130) to 1 million Kenyan 
shillings (U.S. $13,200) and penalizes vendors who sell unlicensed publications.  
Anyone caught selling illegal publications faces six months in jail and a fine of 
20,000 Kenyan shillings (U.S. $265)”); see also Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra 
note 84, at 17 (reporting that numerous Kenyan journalists believe that 
defamation laws are the greatest threat to freedom of expression because an often 
corrupt judiciary will set damage awards artificially high, bankrupting smaller 
news outlet that cannot afford the damages and thus encouraging self-
censorship). 
102 Jillo Kadida, Kenya: Court Throws Out Kiunjuri Case on Defamation Against 
“Nation”, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.nation 
.co.ke/news/-/1056/477000/-/tkx6nh1-/index.html. 
103 See CONSTITUTION, art. 79(2) (2008) (Kenya) (stating that exceptions to 
freedom of expression can be made when it is reasonably required for defense and 
public policy). 
104 Darbishire, supra note 97, at 3 (discussing the fundamental human right of 
access to information); see also Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 14–
15 (describing the case of several land reform advocates being arrested on 
trumped up murder charges in order to silence their protests of the Kenyan 
government’s land grabbing policies). 
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Highly connected Kenyans used the judiciary, through 
defamation suits, to chill the ability of the press to report on 
allegations or reports of corruption.105  Legislative reforms passed 
by the one party parliament prior to the first multi-party elections 
in 1992 enhanced damage awards for those found to have been 
defamed further compromised the development of a lively, open 
and free press and particularly hampered the press’s ability to 
expose the misdeeds of politicians of the one party era.106  While 
defamation suits have been used to make corruption public, the 
High Court in Francis Lotodo v. Star Publishers declined to limit the 
distribution of allegedly defamatory statements.107  The court held 
that the public’s interest in free expression was more important, 
unless the applicant could show that there was “a substantial risk 
of grave injustice and the private interest in preventing the 
discussion outweighs the public interest.”108  However, Kenyan 
courts have limited the ability of the press to freely report even 
when the issues involved were of general public interest, such as 
the common law sub-judice rule109 (commonly cited by corrupt 
officials) and the lack of a community of interest between readers 
and newspapers.110 
Another way in which the government has limited reporting 
on corruption is through the use of the so-called “Official Secrets 
                                                     
105 See Oraro v. Mwangi, petition 1205 of 1993 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi 
July 6, 1993) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (awarding the plaintiff, a lawyer, 
1.5 million Kenyan Shillings, roughly $33,000 U.S. dollars).  The previous highest 
award prior to the amendment had been one-fifteenth of this amount.  See P.G. 
Okoth v. Wachira, appeal 48 of 1977 (Court of Appeal for Kenya) (unreported), 
cited in Gibson Kamau Kuria, The Interpretation of the Law of the Press in Kenya, THE 
ADVOCATE, June 1994, at 18. 
106 “Provided that where the libel is in respect of an offence punishable by 
death the amount assessed shall not be less than one million shillings [U.S. 
$20,000], and where the libel is in respect of an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of not less than three years the amount assessed shall not 
be less than four hundred thousand shillings [U.S. $5000].”  The Defamation Act, 
(2005) Cap. 36 § 16A (Kenya).  These amounts are exorbitant even for the big, 
foreign-owned newspapers. 
107 Lotodo v. Star Pubishers, petition 883 of 1998, (High Ct. of Kenya at 
Nairobi May 12, 1998) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search). 
108  Id. at *3. 
109 The sub-judice rule bars newspapers from reporting on cases filed in the 
courts that are not yet the subject of open court proceedings. For details, please 
refer to George Oraro, supra note 103. 
110  See Daily Nation v. Mukundi, (1975) E.A.L.R. 311, 315 (Kenya). 
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Act.”111  In the recent past, the Kibaki government defended the 
lack of transparency in the military’s procurement of contracts 
through the need for secrecy surrounding such national security 
matters.  The then Minister of State in charge of National Security 
and the Provincial Administration, Chris Murungaru, defended 
the Kibaki government from charges of wrongdoing on the 
grounds that the previous government had entered into most of 
the contracts and that his government simply inherited them.112  
Regarding the Navy ship contract—procured while he was 
Minister of State in charge of National Security—Murungaru 
argued that, before it was awarded to a Spanish consortium of 
companies, there had been a procurement process involving eight 
international companies.  He claimed this was done even though, 
among all nations, contracts for national security items are 
awarded through closed bidding and single sourcing methods.113  
Remarkably, the High Court has effectively held that the 
government’s interest in contractual confidentiality supersedes the 
public’s interest in investigating allegations of corruption in a 
contract between the government and a corporation.114 
Only rarely has the judiciary spoken in defense of press 
freedom in the manner it did in Cyrus Jirongo v. Nation 
Newspapers.115  In Cyrus Jirongo, the court observed that the “public 
at large has a interest in knowing how public funds are being spent 
by a statutory corporation that administers public funds.”116  The 
allegation that public funds were being wasted made the public 
interest in the case more significant than in cases where 
newspapers were restricted from printing information.  Similarly, 
                                                     
111 See The Preservation of Public Security Act, (2005) Cap. 57. (Kenya) 
(stating rules and regulations for the preservation of public security). 
112 Murungaru Speaks Out on Graft Claims, DAILY NATION, Feb. 8 2006, available 
at http://www.nation.co.ke/magazines/-/1190/106754/-/lstujfz/-/index.html. 
113 According to Murungaru, “[I]t is the practice the world over, including in 
the ‘democracy champions’ that are Britain and the U.S., for military and security-
related acquisitions to be done through closed tenders and often through single 
sourcing.”  Id. 
114 See Nedermar Technology BV Ltd. v. Kenya Anti-Corruption Comm’n, 
petition 290 of 2006 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi Oct. 30, 2008) (Elec. Kenyan L. 
Rep., Case Search) (holding that the public interest is safeguarded where the 
Kenyan government asserts a defense of contractual confidentiality to corruption 
charges brought in the Hague). 
115  THE ARTICLE 19 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HANDBOOK 160–61 (Sandra Coliver 
ed., 1993) (discussing Jirongo v. Nation Newspapers Ltd., No. 5276 (High Ct.) 
(Kenya) (1992)). 
116  Id. 
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in Kamlesh Pattni v. Attorney General the High Court held that 
media publicity per se does not constitute a violation of the right to 
a fair hearing.117 
4.5. Freedom of Expression in the Context of Donor Criticism of 
Government Corruption 
In September 1991, Denmark announced aid cuts to Kenya 
following a report that official corruption had siphoned off over 
$40 million (U.S.) from Danish-sponsored projects in 1990.  
Norway, another donor critical of Moi-era corruption, strongly 
protested the arrest of Koigi Wa Wamwere upon his return to 
Kenya in October 1991.  The large amounts of aid flowing in from 
Denmark and Norway put Kenya in a high-risk situation for 
corruption to have a widespread impact on human rights because 
of the large amount of money available to the government for 
misuse.  This risk is especially high when coupled with the fact 
that the government decisions in Kenya were generally not 
transparent or open to the general public.118  Norway’s criticism 
and growing concerns about corruption led the Kenyan 
government to terminate diplomatic links with Norway.  
Announcing the termination, then Foreign Affairs minister Ndolo 
Ayah condemned Norway for providing sanctuary to Kenyan 
“criminal fugitives.”  Said Ayah: 
We cannot be held ransom by anybody in terms of aid or 
otherwise [sic].  This country cannot be told what to do, 
how to do it, just because somebody happens to be giving 
us aid.  Aid has to be given in the context of respect, 
friendship and good relations between countries.119 
This termination of diplomatic ties with Norway was 
overwhelmingly endorsed by a Parliamentary resolution in the 
single-party Parliament. 
While the Nation Alliance of Rainbow Coalition government of 
President Kibaki that ascended to power more than a decade later 
did not cut diplomatic ties with the U.K. or the growing number of 
                                                     
117 The holding was affirmed in Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru v. Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission and Another (Murungaru II), petition 54 of 2006 (High Ct. of 
Kenya at Nairobi Dec. 1, 2006) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search). 
118  See generally supra Section 4.4 (Why Freedom of Expression is Important). 
119 See James Gathii, Center for Law and Research, Int’l Legal Political 
Transition Project, The External Interest in Kenya’s Impending Change 16 (2002). 
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nations critical of Kenya’s high-level official corruption, Kiraitu 
Murungi’s advice that these embassies should stay within the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sounds quite similar 
to Ndolo Ayah’s 1991 address to Norway.  The Ayah-Murungi 
position that donors should not interfere with Kenya’s sovereignty 
by criticizing the government of suspected or existing corruption 
ignores Kenya’s freely ratified international, anti-corruption 
treaties.  Further, Kenya’s sovereignty cannot be so fragile that it 
must be defended by invoking the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, as Kiraitu did, or by suspending diplomatic 
ties, as the Kenya African National Union government did in 1991. 
More importantly, since the end of the Cold War, new criteria 
relating to government recognition have emerged.  The criteria for 
collective non-recognition have evolved to constitute a set of 
prerequisites.  This set includes: 
 Support for democracy and the rule of law, 
emphasizing the key role of elections in the democratic 
process. 
 Safeguarding human rights, based on a respect for the 
individual and including equal treatment of ethnic 
minorities. 
 Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to 
international security and regional stability. 
 Commitment to free markets in their economic 
programs including protecting the rights of foreign 
investment and guaranteeing a framework for the 
uninhibited entry of foreign investments consistent with 
the requirements of the World Trade Organization and 
Bretton Woods institutions 
A government that does not meet these criteria may be in 
danger of collective non-recognition.  Notably, these criteria are 
also incorporated in the constitutive documents of the African 
Union as well its economic agenda, stated in the New Economic 
Partnership for African Development.120  There is in fact a peer 
review process under the auspices of the African Union 
                                                     
120 For a more in-depth analysis, please refer to James Gathii, A Critical 
Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in 
an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 
(2003). 
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measuring—on a voluntary basis—a country’s adherence to 
policies of good governance, human rights, and the rule of law.  
Under international law, de-recognition and non-recognition are 
measures usually taken as a last resort.  They are typically 
preceded by negotiation as well as an assortment of other 
measures seeking to influence a state’s behavior, such as 
suspension from certain international forums, open 
condemnations, and sanctions.121  When it occurs, de-recognition 
takes a variety of forms.  It may involve cessation of development 
assistance from bilateral partners, suspension of loans from the 
Bretton Woods institutions until certain conditions are met, or a 
reluctance of international capital and business to invest in a 
country where the government is identified as a pariah in the 
international community. 
In addition, non-governmental organizations such as 
Transparency International, which monitor corruption within 
governments, are also pushing the boundaries between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ states.  This has certainly been seen within the bounds of 
market reformers, especially in the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the leading industrial countries, as will be explored more fully in 
Section 3.  Another reason the Ayah- Kiraitu thesis rings hollow 
today is that Kenya has signed onto international treaties aimed at 
combating corruption.  These treaties are the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption122 and the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.123  By 
virtue of being signatories to these two treaties, Kenya has 
transformed corruption from an issue of purely domestic concern 
to one that has international legal responsibilities.  In fact, as the 
High Court noted in the Murungaru case, “These [treaties] are the 
                                                     
121 For example, in early 2002 when President Mugabe was roundly 
condemned by the United Kingdom and the United States for his land policies 
and his alleged involvement in rigging his election, a number of African states 
hesitated to critique him.  See Dagi Kimani, Why African States Won’t Condemn 
Mugabe, THE EAST AFRICAN, Mar. 4, 2002, available at http://www.theeastafrican 
.co.ke/news/-/2558/239632/-/t7e2o3z/-/index.html; Adolf Mkenda, Why I 
refuse to condemn Mugabe, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, May 7, 2009 (discussing why the 
West has been more critical of Mugabe than other leaders who have worse records 
in the areas of human rights and democracy). 
122 G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 75. 
123 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5. 
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standards upon which the Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic 
Crimes Act must be measured.”124 
4.6. Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption Cases 
As in the prosecution of any criminal case, the investigation 
and prosecution of corruption cases implicates the due process 
rights of those under investigation and prosecution.  While the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes is impugned 
where these rights are violated, there is also the potential for using 
these due process rights to defeat corruption charges and 
prosecution.  In this section, the discussion centers on three 
examples of how well-placed corruption defendants have used the 
Bill of Rights under the Kenyan Constitution to stop corruption 
prosecutions against them.125  At the moment, the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission lists no less than thirty constitutional 
petitions challenging the constitutionality of its corruption 
proceedings, including its investigations, charges, search warrants, 
and the retrieval of documentary evidence. 
One of the most widely reported cases involving due process 
rights in the corruption context is Republic v. Judicial Comms’n of 
Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex parte Saitoti (hereinafter the 
Saitoti decision).126  In this case, a three-judge Constitutional Court 
held that a recommendation made by a Commission of Inquiry 
into the Goldenberg Corruption Affair violated the applicant’s 
pretrial rights to a fair trial.  According to the Court, the 
Commissioners made several remarks, errors, and decisions that 
not only demonstrated bad faith and bias, but also violated the 
applicant’s “constitutional assurance that he will have a fair trial 
                                                     
124 See Murungaru II, at *43 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search).  The Court 
added:  
This is so because, the greatest threat to the socio-economic and political 
substratum in the 21st Century are the quadruple evils of corruption, 
terrorism, drug trafficking and their attendant consequence, money 
laundering. Consequently all trading nations of the world at various 
stages of civilization and democratization have initiated and/or have 
passed similar legislation. 
Id. 
125 See, e.g., Republic v. Jud. Comm’n of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex 
parte George Saitoti, petition 102 of 2006 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi July 31, 
2006) (finding that prosecuting Saitoti would be contrary to the Constitution of 
Kenya). 
126 Id. 
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and presumption of innocence.”127  According to the Court, in 
recommending investigation of the applicant, the Commission of 
Inquiry failed to take into account information it had received that 
demonstrated the applicant’s innocence.  For example, the Court 
noted the Commission had ignored information that the payments 
at issue in the Goldenberg Affair had been made with 
Parliamentary approval.  As such, the Commission’s 
recommendation was also found to have been “indicative of bias” 
and a “failure to act fairly, faithfully and impartially.”128  The Court 
thus prohibited the Attorney General or any other person from 
filing or even prosecuting the applicant for any matter relating to 
the Goldenberg Affair. 
This was not the first time that the High Court had issued 
prohibitory orders against the Attorney General to prevent him 
from bringing charges against a corruption suspect.  In 2001, the 
High Court had issued a similar order directing the Attorney 
General not to bring any further charges that were similar to or a 
variation of those brought against the then powerful cabinet of 
Minister Kipng’eno Arap Ng’eny, because there had been a 
lengthy and unexplained nine-year delay between the time of the 
alleged commission of corruption offenses and the initiation of 
prosecution by the Attorney General in April 2001.129  The Court 
reasoned that having left office nine years earlier, the defendant no 
longer had access to material to mount a defense.  
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no limitation period with 
respect to bringing charges against public officers for abuse of 
office under Kenyan law, the High Court held that the nine-year 
delay was not only oppressive but also “motivated by some 
ulterior motive” 130 and therefore inconsistent with Section 77(1) of 
the Constitution, which requires a criminal defendant to be 
“afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial court.”131 
                                                     
127 Id. at *51 (stating that Section 77(1) of the Kenyan Constitution provides for 
the presumption of innocence). 
128 Id. at *56. 
129 See Republic v. Attorney Gen. ex parte Kipng’eno Arap Ng’eny (Ng’eny 
Case), petition 406 of 2001 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi Nov. 13, 2001) (Elec. 
Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (prohibiting the Attorney General from bringing 
any further charges against Ng’eny); see also MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 
12–14 for a detailed discussion of the Ng’eny case. 
130 MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 25. 
131 CONSTITUION OF KENYA, § 77(1) (1992). 
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On the face, both the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions are very 
plausible.  They appear to aptly remedy procedural injustices 
related to delays in bringing charges against corruption suspects.  
Indeed justice delayed is justice denied.  However, such a reading 
of these decisions is completely off the mark.  Not simply because 
in both instances both persons charged were senior government 
officials, but also because in both cases the courts narrowed their 
inquiry merely to these due process and natural justice rights.  This 
goes against nearly a century of Kenyan criminal law 
jurisprudence where it has always been the case that without an 
express statutory provision, there can be no time limitation with 
regards to prosecutions of criminal offenses.132   
In addition, the courts failed to examine the broader context 
against which the charges had been belatedly brought.  It was not 
until 1997 that an anti-corruption watchdog was eventually 
established.  For the first time, the short-lived Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority brought charges against corruption suspects 
in cases that the prosecuting authority in the country, the Attorney 
General, had long neglected.  Although the Attorney General is 
constitutionally empowered to require the Commissioner of Police 
to investigate any matter which relates to any alleged or suspected 
offense,133 Attorney General Amos Wako has often argued that the 
Commissioner of Police failed to comply with his directives to 
investigate certain offenses.134  In short, a culture of impunity 
developed in Kenya and when a new anti-corruption authority 
was initiated towards the end of the 1990s, its efforts were hobbled 
by claims of inordinate delays in beginning prosecutions.  Further, 
the Saitoti and Ng’eny courts fore-grounded the alleged violations 
of constitutional rights while underplaying their role in buttressing 
the nascent efforts to build a culture of accountability.135  In both 
Saitoti and Ng’eny, the courts could have argued that the applicants 
had yet to show that there was any affront to their rights, since the 
courts had not even had a chance to establish whether the charges 
brought against the applicants had any substance in the first place. 
                                                     
132 See MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 12–14 (discussing time limitations 
with regards to criminal offenses). 
133 CONSTITUION OF KENYA, § 26(4) (1992). 
134 See WAKI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 453 (reprinting Attorney 
General Wako’s Testimony to the Waki Commission regarding the shortcomings 
of Kenya’s law enforcement in investigating certain types of charges). 
135 Id. 
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If the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions had been made to protect 
individuals who were being unfairly harangued by the State, they 
would be good law.  These decisions would have been particularly 
welcome in light of Kenya’s history of criminalization of dissent 
and abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes.136  
Yet, nothing could be further from the possibility that these 
decisions had been aimed at curbing such excesses. 
A major problem with these decisions is that while they are 
based on legally defensible conclusions, their effect was to nip in 
the bud nascent efforts to establish institutions to prosecute corrupt 
offenders and to build a culture of accountability in grand 
corruption cases.  The courts took no account of the fact that the 
accused government officials operated within a constitutional, 
legal and political system that was created and maintained 
precisely to validate the very conduct for which the accused were 
on trial.137 
Clearly in both the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions, the use of the 
Bill of Rights was to protect powerful members of the government 
from an opportunity to be held accountable.  That is why in 
addition to having a culture that encourages exposure of 
corruption, having law enforcement agencies that will investigate 
without fear or favor and a judiciary that will independently try to 
punish offenders are critical to the success of anti-corruption 
strategies.138 
Not only have procedural human rights been used by those in 
power to defeat corruption charges, but so too have contract rights.  
This came to the forefront in the Anglo-Leasing Scandal.  In 2005, 
First Mercantile Securities Corporation was the first of the Anglo-
Leasing Companies to sue the Kenyan government for breach of 
contract for non-payment.139  First Mercantile Securities 
Corporation brought the suit in Swiss court and the Kenyan 
                                                     
136 The Author believes the decisions would also be welcome in light of 
Kenya’s history of defendants having their due process rights violated when they 
are forced to languish in remand prison for years while they await their day in 
court. 
137 See James Thuo Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: 
Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1125–
34 (2008) (discussing how issues of process, though important in validating the 
new Constitution, had shut off other equally important considerations). 
138 NYONG’O, supra note 96, at 78–95. 
139 See KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, THE 
EAST AFRICAN, July 30, 2007, at 1 (citing First Mercantile’s claims against the 
Kenyan government). 
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Government tried to use Mutual Legal Assistance to get the 
particulars of the First Mercantile Securities Corporation.140  This 
was done in an effort to get to the bottom of who had created the 
company, who was running the company, whether they had ties to 
the Kenyan Government, and who had facilitated this corrupt 
agreement.  However, First Mercantile was able to go to court in 
Nairobi and prevent the Kenyan government from acquiring 
further information on the grounds that if the information about 
the company was revealed to Kenya, it would render the pending 
action in Switzerland ‘nugatory’.141  The court ruled, in effect, that 
the importance of contract rights trumped that of the fight against 
corruption and the siphoning of public money.  This decision is 
based on legally defensible conclusions, however given the 
massive amounts of money stolen from the government during the 
Anglo-Leasing Scandal142 and the difficulty the government has 
had getting to the bottom of it.  It is unfortunate that the High 
Court of Nairobi put a halt to the investigation. 
In another case where the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
(“KACC”) was stymied on the basis of legally defensible 
conclusions, a court ruled that section 31 of the Anti-Corruption 
and Economic Crimes Act was unconstitutional.143  This section 
gave the KACC the power to order people to give up their 
passports if they are suspected of corruption or economic crime.  
This ruling was also supported by Keriako Tobiko, the Kenyan 
Director of Public Prosecutions who said that this law was “more 
of an instrument of oppression than an aid to the fight against 
corruption.”144 
                                                     
140 Id. 
141 Jibril Adan & Judy Ogotu, Court Stops KACC’s Probe on Swiss Firm, THE 
STANDARD, July 11, 2007, at 10; see also KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of 
‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, supra note 139, at 2 (discussing background of First 
Merchantile’s claims). 
142 See KACC Stopped from Seeking True Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firm, supra 
note 139, at 2 (stating that the contract with First Mercantile Securities Corp. alone 
was for a total sum of $12,716,250). 
143 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act No. 03 § 31 (2003) (Kenya) 
(“On the ex parte application of the Commission, a court may issue an order 
requiring a person to surrender his travel documents to the Commission if (a) the 
person is reasonably suspected of corruption or economic crime; and (b) the 
corruption or economic crime concerned is being investigated.”). 
144 Nyakundi Nyamboga, Blow on Graft Law Deserved—DPP, THE STANDARD 
(Nairobi), June 27, 2007, at 10. 
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Besides the foregoing cases, there have been several 
constitutional challenges to the powers granted to the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission.  Some cases challenge the Commission’s 
power to ask a person suspected to have obtained wealth 
fraudulently to declare such wealth.  In one such case, the 
applicant argued that these powers were unconstitutional because 
they eroded the right to silence, the right against self-
incrimination145 and the presumption of innocence,146  that 
required one to be considered innocent until proven guilty.147  In 
another case, the forfeiture provisions of these laws were 
challenged for giving the KACC wide discretion that threatens to 
undermine protected rights, including the right not to have private 
property taken away arbitrarily.148  More recently, an increasing 
number of defendants are challenging the legal status of the KACC 
to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.  High Court Judge 
Nyamu barred the KACC from investigating an allegedly corrupt 
contract in which the government paid 3 billion Kenyan 
shillings.149  The basis for this ruling was that the KACC was not 
allowed to investigate corruption cases that occurred before the 
anti-corruption body was created.  Additionally, First Mercantile 
Securities and others have brought into question whether the 
KACC has overstepped its constitutional bounds when it 
investigates or prosecutes corruption cases.150 
 
                                                     
145 CONST. OF KENYA § 77(7) (2008) (“No person who is tried for a criminal 
offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial.”). 
146 Id. § 77(2)(a) (“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence . . . 
shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty.”).  
However, this is qualified by section 77(12)(a) (“Nothing contained in or done 
under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of—subsection (2)(a) to the extent that the law in question imposes 
upon a person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular 
facts.”).  Id. at § 77(12)(a) 
147 See Murungaru II, at *32 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (discussing the 
fairness of a trial in which constitutional guarantees are not met). 
148 Peter Schroth, National and International Constitutional Law Aspects of African 
Treaties and Laws against Corruption, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 95–
103 (2003) (discussing the constitutional concerns that arise with legislation, such 
as the Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, that sweeps broadly in 
an attempt to wipe out illegal behavior). 
149 This contract was with a company called Nedemar Technology BV and 
was for the creation of Project Nexus. 
150 See KACC Stopped from Seeking the Identity of ‘Anglo-Leasing’ Firms, supra 
note 142, at2 (discussing First Mercantile’s claims against KACC). 
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4.7. Separation of Powers Issues 
In Gachiengo v. Republic,151 the High Court held that the 
appointment of a Judge to head the precursor to the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, 
was a violation of the constitutional requirement of separation of 
powers.152  The court also held that the power to undertake 
criminal prosecutions in Kenya was exclusively vested in the 
Attorney General, and for Parliament to the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority such prosecutorial power was a violation of 
the Constitution.  When this decision came down, the cases were 
pending against a Cabinet Minister, a former Permanent Secretary 
and a former Town Clerk of the City of Nairobi – all powerful and 
connected persons at the time.153  Soon after this case, the 
Authority was disbanded.154  The Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission was established thereafter. 
The Gachiengo, Saitoti and Ng’eny cases all demonstrate the 
paradoxical nature of the relationship between human rights and 
corruption.  While it is often assumed that respect for human rights 
can help in combating corruption, it is also true that those who 
stand to lose most from the exposure of corruption are also more 
likely to seek to defend and vindicate their rights in the judiciary.  
Thus, human rights play a paradoxical role in relation to the fight 
against corruption—they help to expose corruption but also give 
those charged with corruption offenses opportunities to defend 
their due process rights in the criminal justice system.  In a 
judiciary like Kenya’s, where rules and rights are often defended as 
process rights, powerful individuals benefit from having to defend 
their cases because courts are unlikely to closely scrutinize the 
totality of the circumstances that result in charges taking too long 
                                                     
151 Gachiengo v. Republic, petition 302 of 2000 (High Ct. of Kenya at Nairobi 
Dec. 22, 2000) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (sitting as a Constitutional 
Court). 
152 See Schroth, supra note 148, at 92; MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 4 
(citing argument from Gachiengo case where defendants argues that it was 
contrary to the principle of separation of power for a judge to preside over a 
corporate prosecutorial body). 
153 These were Kigng’eno arap N’geny, Wilfred Kimalat, and Zipporah 
Wandera respectively.  See MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 8. 
154 See SCHROTH, supra note 148, at 92 (noting that the Kenyan government 
took advantage of the court’s ruling in Gachiengo, which held it unconstitutional 
for a judge to hold the position of high commissioner of the anti-corruption 
commission, to disband the commission even though disbandment was not 
required by the court); MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16, at 12. 
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to reach the courts.  Defendants also benefit from the lack of 
political will that underlies many half-hearted attempts to 
prosecute high-level corruption suspects. 
For example, in Ng’eny the court prohibited the Attorney 
General from bringing charges against a powerful government 
minister on the grounds that the charges were flimsy, even though 
they alleged that the Minister had caused losses to a public 
corporation amounting to over 180 million Kenyan Shillings.  The 
Ng’eny court’s holding must also been seen as an example of the 
ability of a well-heeled defense attorney to legally impugn a legal 
order that is generally inefficient and slow—a quality that benefits 
the wealthy but is unlikely to operate favorably towards the 
thousands of prisoners held for years in custody while awaiting 
trial or an appeal.155 Seen in this broader context, the Saitoti and 
Ng’eny decisions begin to look more like a travesty of justice than 
otherwise.  Similarly, in the Murungaru case, the Court of Appeal 
ordered the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission not to implement 
and enforce a notice to Minister Chris Murungaru asking him to 
declare his wealth under the Anti-Corruption and Economic 
Crimes Act of 2003.156  In a remarkable reversal of the Ng’eny and 
Saitoti tradition, the High Court dismissed the challenge made in 
Murungaru to the constitutionality of the power of given to the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission to require people reasonably 
suspected of corruption to provide statements and records of how 
they acquired their property.  Unlike in Saitoti and Ng’eny, in 
Murungaru the High Court held that these powers were 
constitutionally justified and necessary intrusions into the lives of 
those suspected of having engaged in corruption.157  This judgment 
differed fundamentally from that of the Court of Appeal, which 
                                                     
155 MATI & GITHONGO, supra note 16. 
156 See Murungary v. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (Murungaru I), 
petition 43 of 2006, at *13 (Ct. of App. At Nairobi Mar 24, 2006) (Elec. Kenyan L. 
Rep., Case Search) (ordering a stay of implementation of the notice requesting 
Murungaro to declare his wealth pending an adjudication on the constitutionality 
of the note in the High Court). 
157 See Murungaru II, at *42 (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search) (holding that it 
was not a violation of Murungaru’s constitutional rights to enforce a note 
requesting him to declare his wealth).  In the same tradition as Murungaru is 
Meme v. Republic, (2004) 1 K.L.R. 637 (High Ct.) (Kenya).  In circumstances 
analogous to those in Saitoti, Ngeny and Murungaru, the High Court in Meme 
decided that a constitutional challenge to trial in the Anti-Corruption courts was 
unfounded and would not deny the defendant his right to presumption of 
innocence.  Id. at 691. 
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had initially barred the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission from 
implementing and enforcing a notice to have Murungaru, a former 
powerful Minister in the Kibaki government, disclose his wealth 
and its sources.  The Court of Appeal had noted in its decision that 
it had a duty to protect everyone’s rights even if they had fallen 
from grace. 
Perhaps most discouragingly for human rights advocates 
interested in rooting-out corruption, the Ng’eny, Saitoti and 
Gachiengo cases demonstrate that Kenyan law itself is deeply 
implicated in producing corruption.158  For example, in the Saitoti 
case, the Court referred to the manner in which the alleged corrupt 
payments that resulted in the charges against Saitoti were legally 
mandated under a law passed by Parliament and the payments 
were endorsed in an international agreement between Kenya and 
the International Monetary Fund that the Court found Kenya was 
obliged to comply with under International Law. 
4.7. Impunity as A Result of Rights Based Attacks on Prosecution of 
Corruption Cases 
In 2003 then powerful Minister of Energy Kiraitu Murungi, 
who was a well-known human rights lawyer and campaigner 
before he joined government, argued that it was perhaps time to 
draw a line in the sand and forget and forgive all corruption 
offenders from the past.159  In his view, it was becoming too 
expensive and cumbersome to investigate and prosecute those 
                                                     
158 The view that Kenyan Law has sometimes helped fuel corruption has also 
been taken with regard to laws and acts passed by the Executive Branch.  KENYA 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMM’N & ASS’N OF PROF’L SOCIETIES IN E. AFR., A REPORT OF THE 
JOINT WORKSHOP ON GOVERNANCE, ETHICS AND INTEGRITY AMONG PROFESSIONALS 
5TH–6TH OCTOBER, 2006, 18 (2006) (observing that the proper approval process for 
projects is “lengthy and bureaucratic” and managed by many uncoordinated, 
uncontrolled regulatory boards).  See also Abiya Ochola, Some Laws Enhance 
Corruption— Report, THE STANDARD (Nairobi), July 28, 2007, at 11. 
159 This was not the first time Kiraitu was expressing such views.  See Kiraitu 
Murungi, Putting the Past to Rest: The Dilemmas of Prosecution and Amnesty in the 
Fight Against Corruption (unpublished paper).  Here, in a paper prepared to 
generate debate for Transparency International (Kenya), Kiraitu argued that “[n]o 
effective anti-corruption strategy can be put in place in the present context as it 
would threaten those in power.”  Id. at 7.  This argument was made when 
President Moi was still in power.  His argument, made in 2003, was that the cost 
of prosecution outweighed the benefits of prosecution were made when he was a 
powerful Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.  However, in 2006, he 
resigned in the face of the Anglo-Leasing Corruption scandal in which he was 
implicated. 
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cases.  Time and scarce resources were being expended to 
investigate cases where the trail of evidence had gone cold.  
According to Murungi, the value added in the fight against 
corruption was seen more as retribution against President Moi and 
his cronies by the Kibaki government.  Kiraitu was himself the 
subject of a corruption investigation, and as such his suggestion 
that the fight against corruption should focus on future and not 
previous cases was correctly viewed as a self-serving argument. 
Kiraitu’s exasperation could not also be matched by the 
declaration of the Kibaki government to have a zero-tolerance for 
corruption.  This exasperation about the inability of the courts to 
prosecute corruption cases was in large measure frustrated by the 
use of constitutional challenges to corruption investigations and 
prosecutions for violating the rights of those accused.  While the 
Bill of Rights of the Kenyan Constitution had been declared 
inoperative in the 1980s, in the decade beginning in 2000, the 
judiciary rediscovered it particularly as a weapon of choice by 
those who could afford well lawyers to make their case.  As such, 
rights claims that stood no chance of checking the dictatorial one-
party era of President Moi experienced resurgence as noted above 
in the discussion of the Saitoti and Ng’eny cases.  Gone was the 
deference to the government that characterized the predominant 
judicial temperament of the 1980s and 1990s. 
While Kiraitu’s objection grew out of his exasperation with 
fighting old corruption cases, Justice Aaron Ringera, the Director of 
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, has recently argued in 
favor of limiting prosecution of old corruption cases on grounds 
similar to the equitable doctrine of laches—this time not to delay 
bringing cases such as those the Ng’eny court found 
unconstitutional, but on the fact that there was a limitation of 
bringing cases under Kenya’s corruption laws. 
According to Ringera, Kenya’s Limitations of Actions Act does 
not allow for the recovery of such monies and property six years 
after the date of the commission of the offence.160  Justice Ringera 
asserted that the Commission’s work of recovering stolen assets 
and monies locally and abroad was limited by the statute of 
limitations in this law,, which prohibits recovery six years after 
cases involving breach of trust, fraud, and the looting currently 
prohibited by the Economic Crimes Act, the Anti-Corruption Act, 
                                                     
160 See Lawyers Fault KACC’s Stand on Looted Public Funds, SUNDAY NATION 
(Nairobi), June 3, 2007, at 7. 
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and the Penal Code.  He also argued that the Limitations of Actions 
Act does not permit the pursuit of theft cases after three years. 161 
Justice Ringera’s assertions on the interpretation of the 
Limitations of Actions Act are challengeable on a number of valid 
legal bases.  First, the Limitation of Actions Act has an exception.  
This means that the statutorily imposed limit to prosecute a 
corruption case, or to pursue stolen monies and property, are not 
necessarily, or even strictly, subject to the six-year period he cited.  
That exception provides that the limitation period may be 
extended.162  Justice Ringera’s interpretation of Kenyan law 
inconsistently with the Commission’s declared objective of zero-
tolerance on corruption seemed strikingly similar to the 
jurisprudence of the High Court in the Ng’eny, Saitoti and 
Gachiengo cases as well as to Kiraitu’s proposal to end investigation 
and prosecution of corruption cases.  Thus, there has been a 
convergence in High Court cases as well as the statements of 
highly placed government officials that has tended to acquiesce to 
high-level corruption. 
One of the consequences of this acquiescence to high-level 
corruption cases has been a culture of impunity.  Highly placed 
and well-connected Kenyans interpret the inability to prosecute 
and to hold accountable corrupt individuals in the country as a 
license to engage in further corruption.  Clearly, anger and 
frustration in the public about corruption and the way it has 
siphoned off public resources at the expense of certain 
communities was one of the underlying issues that contributed to 
post-election violence.163  As noted above, the Waki Commission 
                                                     
161  See id.  Whether or not this is actually the case, however, has been debated 
as the Law Society of Kenya disagrees with Mr. Ringera’s assessment. 
162 The power to extend the limitation period is contemplated by the 
Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Chapter 2 of the Laws of Kenya.  
Section 59 of Chapter 2 provides that:  
[w]here in a written law a time is prescribed for doing an act or taking a 
proceeding, and power is given to a court or other authority to extend 
that time, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be 
exercised by the court or other authority although the application for 
extension is not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed. 
 The Interpretation and General Provisions Act, (2007) Cap. 2 § 59. (Kenya). 
163 See KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ON THE BRINK OF THE 
PRECIPICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNT OF KENYA’S POST-2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE 
17–25 (2008) (noting that corruption, particularly regarding land allocation has 
long plagued Kenyans, who had hoped to elect political leaders to tackle the 
problem). 
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on Post-Election Violence also attributed the violence to the culture 
of impunity in the country.164  An opportunity to address impunity 
squarely was lost early in the Kibaki administration when it 
rejected the recommendation of a task force for the establishment 
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  The broad-ranging 
powers the Commission would have wielded were feared to be 
inconsistent with the Kibaki administration’s decision not to 
reopen abuses of the Moi regime.165  The most definitive evidence 
of the lack of commitment on the part of the Kibaki government in 
its self-declared war on corruption was the resignation of John 
Githongo as Permanent Secretary in Charge of Governance and 
Ethics and his decision to leave the country because of threats to 
his life.  Githongo’s investigations exposed how senior members of 
the Kibaki government had engaged in corrupt schemes of 
government procurement variously dubbed the Anglo-Leasing 
scandal.166  According to Githongo’s dossier, Anglo Leasing and 
Finance Company, a company whose incorporation could not be 
traced anywhere in the world, had routinely been awarded huge 
defense and security contracts and that well-connected individuals 
were receiving huge kickbacks as a result.167 
4.8. Minority Rights and Safeguards for Minority Communities 
Kenya’s independence Constitution was designed to safeguard 
rights of minority ethnic communities in a variety of ways.  First, 
there was the regional system of government that created regional 
legislative assemblies and a system of distribution of resources 
from the central to the regions.  Second, there was a Senate in 
addition to a House of Representatives that had representation 
from the regions.  Most importantly, this system of protection of 
rights of minority communities was specially entrenched in the 
                                                     
164 See WAKI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 443–45. 
165 For the Task Force Report, see Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the 
Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15 (2004) (recommending the creation of a Truth 
Commission and suggesting the matters it should investigate and the manner in 
which it should be organized in detail). 
166 See MARS GROUP KENYA, GAP REPORT NO. 2, ILLEGALLY BINDING: THE 
MISSING ANGLO-LEASING SCANDAL PROMISSORY NOTES 25–29 (2007) (providing a 
full report on the scandal, including information from John Githongo), available at 
http://publications.marsgroupkenya.org/GAP_Report2_Passports/GAP2 
_Report_Web_Version.pdf 
167 Id. 
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Constitution.  However, these protections were quickly eroded 
with extensive constitutional amendments such that by the end of 
the 1960s, Kenya had a heavily centralized political system with a 
President whose powers were almost un-limitable.168  President 
Kenyatta and President Moi maintained political power by using 
their patronage over state resources and appointments of key 
representatives of various ethnic communities to government 
positions.169  Post-independence governments put a heavy 
premium on having as much political power as they could and 
argued that this was necessary, as any alternative arrangement 
would impede the rapid realization of national goals.  In the 1980s, 
when privatization reduced opportunities for patronage within the 
government, giving land to political favorites became a major 
source of patronage.  The attendant corruption that resulted from 
irregular and illegal allocations of land was the subject of two 
major government appointed commissions.170 
The illegal and irregular allocation of land and the lack of 
effective voice in the political system by ethnic communities, 
particularly in the Rift Valley, resulted in grievances over land 
issues that formed a critical backdrop against which the violence 
that followed the 2007 elections happened.  This has been 
particularly so for small indigenous communities like the Ogiek of 
the Mau forest who brought suit in the High Court in 1992 for 
                                                     
168 See Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 4–5 (outlining 
constitutional amendments that served to increase the presidential power by 
outlawing all opposing political parties and giving the president the power to fire 
judges and civil servants). 
169 Id. at 4–5 (“the executive branch . . . wield[s] considerable control over the 
judicial and legislative branches of government through a system of patronage 
and threats”); cf. Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B. MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM 
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 514–16 (1970) (charging that the safeguards 
established by the Kenyan Constitution have been whittled down and used by 
ministers to maintain political support); see generally Y.P. Ghai, Independence and 
Safeguards in Kenya, 3 E. AFR. L.J. 177 (1967) (explaining the development and 
importance of provisions in the constitution to safe guard specific regional ethnic 
communities and their weaknesses). 
170 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ILLEGAL/IRREGULAR 
ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC LAND (2004) (reporting the results of the commission to 
investigate corrupt allocation of public land, identify specific instances of 
corruption, and suggest remedies); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE 
LAND LAW SYSTEM OF KENYA ON PRINCIPLES OF A NATIONAL LAND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK, CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF LAND AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION (2002) (reporting the results of the 
commission to survey national land relations and propose a national Land Policy). 
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being unlawfully evicted from the Tinet forest.171  The Ogiek 
claimed that their eviction from their land violated their right to an 
ancestral home and their right to a livelihood consistent with their 
rights.  The High Court dismissed their case, ruling that the 
eviction was neither discriminatory nor illegal or unconstitutional.  
The attitude of the High Court in this and similar cases exemplifies 
the government’s lack of responsiveness to claims of minority and 
indigenous communities.  In addition, the Kenyan government 
abstained from supporting the adoption of the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples172 in September 2007, further 
indicating its unwillingness to confront the question of indigenous 
communities in the country. 
One of the most contentious issues prior to the vote on the 
referendum for a new proposed Constitution in Kenya was 
whether there ought to be a regional system of government as a 
safeguard against abuse of minority rights.  This debate indicated 
the extent to which safeguards would give minority communities 
in the country a voice within the government.  Conversations 
continue as to whether these regional arrangements could check 
governmental abuses of power such as the illegal and irregular 
allocations of land as well as expulsions of indigenous 
communities from their homes.  Regional governments would also 
reduce the discretion and attendant corruption often associated 
with a centralized government. 
4.9. Social and Economic Rights and the Anti-Corruption Agenda 
Social and economic rights include the rights to education,173 
work174 and health.175  Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, in 
emphasizing the importance of social and economic rights, have 
argued that any approach to human rights which “finds no place 
for a right of access to primary healthcare [] is [] flawed in terms 
both of the theory of human rights and of United Nations 
                                                     
171 Kemai v. Attorney Gen., Civil Case 238 of 1999 (High Ct. of Kenya at 
Nairobi Mar. 23, 2000) (Elec. Kenyan L. Rep., Case Search). 
172 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007). 
173 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], 
art. 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
174 Id. art. 6. 
175 Id. art. 12. 
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doctrine.”176  Indeed, the Committee on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights notes that the right to health under Article 12 (2) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”):  
embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that 
promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, 
and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such 
as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable 
water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working 
conditions, and a healthy environment.177   
This definition falls in the second positive and expansive definition 
of the right to health which in turn implicates obligations on states 
to ensure “equality, equity, well-being, fairness, and justice in 
reforming health systems—reducing disparities, respecting difference, 
and eliminating inequities in health worldwide.”178 
However, corruption often depletes resources that would 
otherwise go to fund access to adequate healthcare facilities, 
equipment, supplies and personnel as well as to the underlying 
determinants of good health including food, housing and safe 
potable water.  Thus, corruption undermines the ability of 
governments not merely to meet their citizens’ wants and needs, 
but rather their social and economic rights.  In the 1970s, 
international lawyers began to advocate for what were previously 
thought of as needs and wants in terms of rights.  By substituting 
rights for needs, they sought to transform the concept of needs into 
one of legal entitlement.  For these lawyers, to assert that a 
particular social claim or need was a human right was to “vest it 
emotionally and morally with an especially high degree of 
legitimacy.”179 
However, this novel strategy, developed in the Cold War 
context of the 1970s, was met with the rebuttal that social and 
                                                     
176  Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, 
Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 95 (1992). 
177 U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], COMM. ON ECON., SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: 11/08/2000, 
CESR Gen. Comment 14, ¶4, U.N.DOC. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
178 The Global Assembly on Advancing the Human Right to Health, Iowa 
City, Iowa Apr. 20-22, 2001, The Iowa City Appeal on Advancing the Human Right to 
Health, 2 (Apr. 22, 2001). 
179 Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic 
Questions, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 171, 174 (1969). 
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economic rights were not justiciable or enforceable in court.  
Opponents argued that social and economic rights were vague and 
imprecise that they did not establish imperatives that could be 
enforced by a court of law in the same way that civil and political 
rights do.  This vagueness, they argued, was evidenced in the 
language of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICSECR”).  For example, states are required to 
recognize the rights to work, health, education, social security, an 
adequate standard of living, just and favorable conditions of work, 
and participation in and enjoyment of the fruits of culture and 
science.  By contrast, in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), rights are declared.  Similarly, the 
ICSECR directs parties to undertake to ensure a right; whereas rights 
in the ICCPR are declared and ensured rather than recognized. 
In addition to lacking concrete social and economic rights, the 
ICESCR failed to make social and economic rights subject to the 
immediate realization to which the ICCPR was subject, instead 
adopting a standard of progressive realization.  A further 
limitation of the ICESCR is that it only requires states to undertake 
these steps to the maximum of their available resources.180  In its 
General Comments, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, has clarified the legal obligations that state parties 
have against the backdrop of references to progressive realization 
and to maximum available resources.  Hence, it has observed that the 
concept of progressive realization “should not be misinterpreted as 
depriving the obligation of all meaningful content.  It is on the one 
hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the 
real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring 
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”181  The 
reference to maximum available resources can only be invoked if a 
state can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”182  The Committee 
has also concluded that the ICESCR requires every state party to 
ensure the satisfaction of a minimum core obligation of “at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.”183 
                                                     
180 ICESCR, supra note 173, at art. 2(1). 
181 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations ¶ 9, U.N.DOC. E/1991/23 (Dec. 12, 1990). 
182 Id. ¶ 10. 
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In 1993, the United Nations Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights categorically recognized the indivisibility and 
interdependence between social and economic rights on the one 
hand, and civil and political rights on the other.184  Since then, there 
has been an increasing commitment to the recognition of the 
interdependence between social and economic rights and civil and 
political rights.185 
The impact of corruption on social and economic rights is 
illustrated in the following example.  In May 2006, a courageous 
Kenyan who had blown the whistle on corruption in relation to a 
government sponsored, low-cost housing scheme was shot.  
Luckily, the shots were not fatal.186  In this corruption case, senior 
government officials, politicians and their aides had been 
irregularly allocated several housing units intended to benefit poor 
Kenyans living in the informal Majengo area of Nairobi.  This 
corruption scandal shows that even when the government actually 
gets to spend money on social programs to benefit the poor, there 
is a real possibility of such projects being hijacked by well to do.  
This and many other cases demonstrate the importance of an 
understanding of human rights that integrates both civil and 
political rights and social and economic rights.  The fight against 
corruption is, at the end of the day, a fight for all human rights. 
4.10.  Conclusions:  Transforming the Anti-Corruption Agenda Using 
Rights 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of the 
relationship between corruption and human rights.  First, in the 
context of Kenya, the relationship between corruption and human 
rights has been ambiguous.  That is to say, the Bill of Rights has 
largely been used by well-heeled lawyers asserting due process 
claims to defend persons accused of high-level corruption.  The 
fact that Kenyan courts have acquiesced to these arguments in 
                                                     
184  See Shadrack B.O. Gutto, Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of 
Implementing/Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 79, 87–88 (1998) (discussing the problems associated with unequal 
approaches to the protection of human rights based on their categorical 
grouping). 
185 See generally Craig Scott, Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category 
of ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21 HUM, RTS. Q. 633 (1999) (providing in-
depth analysis of the implications of categorical grouping of human rights). 
186 Ayub Savula & Cyprus Ombati, Whistle Blower Shot After Exposing Scam, 
THE STANDARD (Nairobi), May 25, 2006, at 36. 
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leading cases has greatly hampered the prosecution of corrupt 
officials, especially those associated with high-level corruption. 
A second conclusion is that corruption has undermined respect 
for human rights within the country.  For example, the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has recognized a connection between 
Kenya’s inability to adhere to its obligations under that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and corruption in the 
country. 
These conclusions are unsurprising given that the essential 
nature of the Kenyan State as well as its Constitution have 
remained intact and unchanged for several decades now.  The 
Kenyan State is highly centralized in the Presidency, who has 
enormous power under the Constitution.  This has resulted in a 
high stakes politics because the Constitution establishes a winner-
takes-all system in which the losing political parties are excluded 
not only from political power, but from other State benefits, upon 
conceding defeat.  An effort to undertake citizen driven 
comprehensive constitutional reforms that would have radically 
democratized the political and economic nature of the Kenyan 
State was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons in a referendum in 
2005.187 
This analysis establishes for developing rights-based strategies 
for addressing corruption within Kenya.  It would be naïve to 
simply assume that a revamped Bill of Rights would, in and of 
itself, result in more vigorous prosecutions against corruption, in 
light of the fact that the constitutional machinery designed to 
combat corruption is itself corrupted.  The following short list of 
Constitutional reforms would begin the long road to truly 
democratizing the Kenyan State and alleviating the effects of 
corruption on Kenyan jurisprudence:  (1) democratize the State by 
reducing the powers of the Presidency in relation to the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, as well as to Civil Society; (2) create an 
independent, impartial and free judiciary that is a watchdog of the 
human rights of all Kenyan citizens; (3) draft a Bill of Rights that 
guarantees civil and political rights, social and economic rights, 
                                                     
187 See James Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing and 
Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2008) 
(discussing the unsuccessful Constitutional reform in 2005).  For a discussion of 
the origins of comprehensive and citizen driven constitutional reform aimed at 
fundamental reform to change the political and economic structure of the country 
see WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
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rights of children, women, minorities as well as the disabled; and 
(4) make a fair land policy that is free of corruption and makes 
land available to all. 
Human rights will remain important on the journey to 
democratizing the Kenyan state, just as they were in other contexts, 
such as South Africa.188  Freedom of expression, for example, will 
continue to be crucial in exposing corruption to public scrutiny.  
The government’s effort to cover up corruption has been less 
successful in recent years.  Today, Kenyans have access to 
information from multiple radio and television outlets, unlike in 
the days of a single government-run radio and television station.  
Additionally, there continues to be a vibrant mainstream and 
alternative press with a variety of daily, weekly and monthly 
newspapers.  Many of these have websites which publish most, if 
not all, the contents of their hardcopy papers.  Furthermore, 
Kenyans can access information about corruption within the 
country through Internet sources based outside the country.  For 
example, a dossier on corruption scandals in the Kibaki 
government was released by former Governance and Ethics 
Permanent Secretary John Githongo on an Internet site in 2005.189 
The anti-corruption agenda will only be transformed when the 
range of human rights concerns are expanded.  The Ng’eny and 
Saitoti decisions were individualized claims of rights violations.  
However, if we understand corruption as nationwide problem, 
disabling the government from meeting the millions of Kenyans’ 
rights to health, education and housing, we can start to address 
injustices at a much broader and generalized level.  The category of 
human rights violations should be expanded to cover women, 
children, minorities and the disabled.  A broader conception of 
                                                     
188 See Makau Wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of 
Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 63 (1997) ("[T]he democratic rebirth of 
the South African state . . . has arguably been the most historic event in the human 
rights movement . . . .”); see also Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 151 (1998) (arguing that South Africa 
has “adopted a postliberal constitution, one that may be read not only as open to 
but committed to large-scale egalitarianism social transformation”). 
189 John Githongo was a Permanent Secretary in Charge of Governance and 
Ethics in the Kibaki government.  The dossier contained his findings on his 
investigations which he submitted to the President.  He resigned from his position 
towards the end of 2005 following threats on his life by senior members of the 
government whom he was investigating.  The Project KTM Consolidated Report, 
dated April 27th, 2004, also known as the “Kroll Report,” revealing a trail of 
corruption scandals from the Moi to the Kibaki government was also released 
online. 
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rights is in light of the finding of John Githongo that both the Moi 
and Kibaki governments established fictitious companies, which 
were in turn paid billions of U.S. dollars for ostensible defense and 
security contracts.  While this money enriched a few individuals 
and helped to finance their political incumbency, millions of 
Kenyans were deprived of resources that would have financed 
programs of public education, health, housing and water, among 
other services. 
In short, the Ng’eny and Saitoti decisions reflect not only the 
fact that the Kenyan Constitution protects civil and political rights 
at the expense of social and economic rights, but also that if this 
continues, the full democratization of the Kenyan State will never 
be realized.  The protection of civil and political rights without 
simultaneously protecting and safeguarding a minimal core of the 
social and economic rights of a majority of the population is 
insufficient to protect the rights of all Kenyans. 
Yet there is another tradition in the legal system that has given 
a different, and perhaps more hopeful interpretation, of anti-
corruption statutes.  In the Murungaru decision, the High Court 
ignored the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions by holding constitional the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority’s power to seek information 
from a corruption suspect.  Instead, the High Court noted:  
[T]he massive and debilitating cancerous nature of 
corruption in Kenya has impoverished and continues to 
impoverish the great majority of the Kenyan masses and 
leads to robbing the government of resources to build and 
maintain a run-down infrastructure, inadequate health 
services and mediocre and inadequate educational facilities.  
It has led to spiral inflation and unemployment.190 
Though this was a stunning departure from the narrowly 
legalistic route followed by the Saitoti and Ng’eny decisions, the 
need to broaden the scope of rights implicated by corruption 
remains an important agenda.  Additionally, it must be 
accompanied by efforts to make the President accountable.  If, as 
the Githongo dossier revealed, the architects of massive corruption 
schemes in the government were unconcerned that Githongo 
would report their corruption scheme to the President, then grand 
corruption has no real check.  That is why an effective battle 
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against corruption must be accompanied by broad based 
constitutional reform to decentralize executive power and to make 
it more accountable to Parliament, the judiciary and, therefore, to 
the People. 
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL AND FAIRNESS ISSUES ARISING FROM A FOCUS 
ON GRAND VERSUS PETTY CORRUPTION 
5.1. Introduction 
This Section explores how anti-corruption and judicial reform 
initiatives impact the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged in 
African countries.  I make two primary claims.  First, I show that 
judicial reform initiatives give priority to facilitating the 
implementation of market reforms to ensure that investors can 
enforce their rights at the lowest cost and within the shortest time.  
By contrast, there is little or no effort to ensure access to courts, 
lower costs or shortening the time period within which the poor, 
the marginalized and the disadvantaged can similarly enforce their 
rights within the judicial system.  For example, large numbers of 
the incarcerated poor go without a fair trial or even access to the 
judicial system to enforce their rights.191  On the other hand, the 
rights of investors are protected by the government through large-
scale legal reform efforts. 
Second, I show that anti-corruption reforms privilege investors, 
making it easier for them to do business, rather than address the 
problems related to corruption that are faced by the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged.  For example, while petty 
corruption affects the poor disproportionately—as when the police 
enforce city ordinances to shut down or demolish informal open-
air markets192—it seems to get less attention from reformers in both 
the public and non-governmental sectors.  By contrast, when there 
is grand corruption or theft of public resources—as when bribes 
are involved in contact bids by foreign corporations—the outcry is 
bigger than when petty corruption affects the poor’s ability to get 
access to government services, enroll in vocational and teacher 
training colleges supported by the state or obtain employment in 
the private sector.  Of course, my argument is not that grand 
                                                     
191 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 41-42 (discussing 
vulnerable groups and the right to fair trial). 
192 See Kenya’s Unfinished Democracy, supra note 84, at 20–21. 
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corruption does not negatively affect the poor.  Rather, my claim is 
that petty corruption disproportionately affects the poor and yet it 
is seldom the focus of attention in anti-corruption reform 
initiatives. 
In my conclusions, I argue that efforts to address issues of 
poverty primarily through market-centered reforms that foreclose 
addressing questions of inequality and injustice193 can be reframed 
to alleviate the conditions of the poor, by making these central 
goals in economic and judicial reform.  The problem with current 
economic and legal reform initiatives is that issues of inequality 
and injustice are not regarded as integral issues.  These reform 
programs seek to deal with inequality and injustice indirectly not 
through public spending, but rather through the trickle down 
effects of private investment.194  Thus a fundamental problem with 
current approaches to addressing the of challenges posed by 
poverty is that they discourage and discredit such public 
spending.195  By shunning traditional tax and transfer mechanisms, 
market- based approaches addressing issues of poverty are also 
disproportionately injurious to women.196 
First, I will study the effects corruption has on the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged.  I will next examine the ways in 
which judicial reform initiatives are designed to favor the interests 
of investors.  Finally, I will show that judicial and anti-corruption 
reform projects as presently constituted do little or nothing to 
promote the interests of the poor, marginalized and 
disadvantaged.  In my conclusion, I briefly outline how to ensure 
that anti-corruption, judicial and investment reforms can be 
                                                     
193 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING 
POVERTY 61–72, 189–200 (2000) (discussing market reform to be more responsive to 
poor populations). 
194 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and Human Rights: The 
Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 503 (1999) (arguing that this is 
due in large part to the self-serving interests of western countries and NGOs who 
seek to further advance themselves through anti-corruption initiatives in 
developing countries). 
195 See James Thuo Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of 
Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 181 (2003) (criticizing the NEPAD as a 
capitalist vision of a market-centered development plan that does not take in to 
consideration the uniqueness of African nations’ economic situations). 
196 See Kerry Rittich, Engendering Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L. 
REV. 575, 593 (2003) (explaining the need to include gender equality as a variable 
when creating economic development plans). 
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structured to provide for market efficiency without neglecting the 
needs of the poor. 
5.2. How Corruption Affects the Poor, Marginalized and 
Disadvantaged 
While corruption had become a central tenet of the good 
governance agenda by the mid-1990s, the primary focus of the anti-
corruption agenda has been to reduce its impact on private 
investment.  Far less attention has been paid to the impact of 
corruption on those who suffer most from its consequences—the 
poor, marginalized and disadvantaged.  For example, corruption is 
directly correlated to poor educational achievement in African 
countries.197  The poor and the disadvantaged rely heavily on the 
public educational system to educate their children.  Education is 
often the surest path out of poverty.  Yet the educational systems in 
many African countries are adversely affected by corruption.  
Corruption in the educational system of many of these countries 
commonly takes the form of bribery as a precondition to admitting 
students.198  Other types of low-level corruption include 
government clerks taking money for petty bureaucratic matters 
such as processing educational transcripts and certificates; officials 
taking bribes in return for staff recruitment and promotion; and 
money changing hands at different stages of government 
procurement.199  There are also examples of teachers bribing 
government officials to transfer them from schools located in poor 
areas where roads are inaccessible and amenities like piped water 
and electricity are hard to come by.  Unfortunately, the areas that 
are hit hardest by poverty, are almost those most in need of quality 
teachers. 
It is clear that petty corruption imposes high costs on the poor, 
in particular.  The poor have to contend not only with inadequate 
                                                     
197 See Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 1, at 56–57 (explaining the 
impact of corruption on education). 
198 See Terracino, supra note 1, at 27–31 (noting that many parents have to 
bribe educators or become involved in corruption in other ways to obtain 
education for their children). 
199 See Dilip Parajuli, What is Driving Educational Ineffectiveness in Kenya?  The 
Role of Economic Inefficiency, Institutional Corruption and Poverty 7 (2001) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Transparency International-Kenya) 
(outlining these different forms of corruption); see also Corruption and Human 
Rights, supra note 1, at 31–58 (providing an in depth look at various types of low 
level corruption and how each affects the human rights of citizens in particularly 
the poor). 
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service provisioning, but also have to make “payments” for the 
delivery of even the most basic government activity, such as the 
issuing of official documentation.200  In many countries, applicants 
for a national identification card, a driver’s licenses, building 
permits and other routine documents have learned to expect a 
“surcharge” from civil servants.  In such cases, civil servants such 
as nurses, members of the military, policemen, guards, and custom 
officers constantly pressure poorer farmers and merchants to come 
up with bribes.  A study by the Index of Economic Freedom found 
an increase in corruption by low ranking officials in Algeria, 
Lebanon and Tunisia and claims that petty corruption rises as real 
incomes fall because “public servants attempt to compensate for 
the loss in purchasing power by demanding more bribes.”201   
Petty corruption is not usually the primary target of anti-
corruption reforms.202  Even when it is, the Kenyan government is 
reluctant to address the inadequate compensation of officers, 
encouraging this corruption to fester.  Together, petty corruption 
constitutes the government’s entire commitment to fighting 
corruption and is achieved through the prosecution of only low-
level officers.203  Thus, while big level corruption is generally the 
focus of most anti-corruption initiatives, prosecution of low-level 
government officials engaging in petty corruption occurs more 
                                                     
200 See Parajuli, supra note 199, at 5–7 (linking inefficiencies in the educational 
system in Kenya with corruption); see also TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL KENYA, 
THE KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008 11 (2008), available at http://www.tikenya.org 
/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf [hereinafter KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008] 
(finding that 76% of the Kenyans surveyed had been forced to pay a bribe in the 
past year). 
201 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 203–14 
(2003) (reporting that although grand corruption had fallen in the Middle East 
and North Africa in 2001–2002, petty corruption had risen); see also UNITED 
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 18–19 (2004) (finding that 
policemen in Indonesia, who are notoriously badly paid, will often arrest people 
for the purpose of seeking bribes and compensation from them). 
202 See Stephen Mburu, After Ringera, Focus Now on Wako, SUNDAY NATION 
(Nairobi), Oct. 3, 2009 (alluding to the fact that ‘big fish’ were hardly prosecuted 
under Ringera’s reign as Director of the Kenyan Anti Corruption Authority), 
available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/667428/-/xu9jifz/-
/index.html. 
203 But see Press Release, The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, Press 
Statement On the Performance of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, (Sept. 
18, 2007) (defending the Kenya Anti-Corruptions Commission efforts to eradicate 
all forma of corruption, not just that of “small-fish”), available at 
http://www.kacc.go.ke/archives/pressreleases/performance-statement.pdf. 
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often because such officials can be easily prosecuted without fear 
of major political fallout.204  Petty corruption is responsible for 
huge sums of money changing hands because the many rivulets of 
petty corruption may add up to a mighty stream of corruption.  
Estimates today put global petty corruption in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually.205 
5.2.1. Education 
A Transparency International bribery survey of over 2000 
Kenyans showed that average citizens paid $175 to obtain access to 
government services.206  Corruption, therefore, undercuts the 
provision of public services such as healthcare, education, 
transportation and local policing.207  Since the poor have fewer 
resources of their own, they are more likely to rely on such 
government services and are therefore susceptible to being 
disproportionately affected when these services are unavailable 
because of corruption or are only available at a surcharge they 
                                                     
204 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 201, 
at 31–32 (questioning the success of the anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong 
because the government has only prosecuted low-level corruption and has not 
prosecuted any high officials since 1992). 
205 See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: 
Expanding the scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employer, 46 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 425, 427–28 (2009) (stating that forty to sixty of the 240 to 300 billion 
dollars lost in corruption annually is through bribery and petty corruption); A 
First Estimate of Petty Corruption, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Dec. 20, 2002, (stating 
that petty corruption in India is nearly 27 billion core annually), available at 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/a-first-estimate-of-petty-corruption 
/64987/#; Petty Corruption is a 45 Billion Rupee Industry in Pakistan, South Asia 
News, Aug. 12, 2006 (relaying findings regarding corruption levels in Pakistan), 
available at http://www.southasianews.com/NewsPrint.asp?nid=89207.  But see 
United Nations Development Programme, TACKLING CORRUPTION, TRANSFORMING 
LIVES: ACCELERATING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 2 (2008) 
(stating that corruption estimates are imprecise because they’re determined 
through public opinion’s on bribery and not so much on reported instances), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/asiathepacific 
/RHDR_Full%20Report_Tackling_Corruption_Transforming_Lives.pdf. 
206 See KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 2008, supra note 200, at 10.  But see TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, INTEGRITY CHECK 2003: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING 
INTEGRITY IN THE NARC GOVERNMENT AND THE JUDICIARY (2003) (surveying public 
opinion regarding the extent of corruption in government and finding that most 
Kenyans are warily optimistic regarding corruption in their country), available at 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Integritycheck.ppt. 
207 See Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 1, at 3 (“Corruption hinders 
the delivery of state services that individuals are entitled to, preventing the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.”). 
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cannot afford.  According to the Center for Governance and 
Development, the Kenyan government lost Ksh 475 billion through 
corruption, negligence and wastefulness.”208  The “Education 
[m]inistry alone wasted Ksh 33.9 billion—7.1% of total loss in the 
same period, and ranks third among all the ministries behind the 
President’s Office and Local Government. . . .”209  A “majority of 
losses come from unrecovered university student loans and un-
surrendered institutional grants.”210  These unrecovered or un-
surrendered amounts are usually non-recoverable.211  The report 
concluded that it could be “safely assumed that much of it is 
already diverted to personal gain.”212 
At the micro-level, the current 8-4-4 system of education in 
Kenya tries to cover a wide range of subjects with extensive 
contents, a task that is impossible to accomplish in the allotted 
time.213  “This has led to out-of-school classes or ‘coaching’ where 
teachers make money” by providing private tuition after school 
hours.214  Private tuition has been converted into a “money-minting 
enterprise.”215  Teachers “deliberately fail to cover the syllabus 
during the normal school hours and wait to teach during the extra 
hours to make a quick buck.”216  Of course, children from poor 
homes cannot afford such extra costs of tuition.  In addition, many 
schools are dilapidated and ill-equipped. 
5.2.2. Health and Safety 
The diversion of public resources, services and assets into 
private use takes resources away from essential medical services 
and contributes to deteriorating infrastructure that subsequently 
affects the health and safety of the public and in particular the 
                                                     
208 Parajuli, supra, note 203 at 7 (citing CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, A SURVEY OF SEVEN YEARS OF WASTE: A STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN 
KENYA BY THE CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, 2001 and Controller & 
Auditor General reports, 1991–1996). 
209 Parajuli, supra note 199, at 7. 
210 Id. at 8. 
211 See Parajuli, supra, note 199 at 8 (surmising that lost loans and grant are 
very difficult to ever recover). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 9. 
214 Id.; See also Bacio Terracino, supra note 1, at 27–30 (stating that this is a 
problem in many developing nations struggling to reduce corruption). 
215 Parajuli, supra note 199, at 9. 
216 Id. 
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poor. 217  Poor infrastructure, storage and maintenance at health 
centers has lead to damaged or expired drugs, resulting in either 
ineffective medical treatment or patients who do not have access to 
the drugs they need.218  In Kenya, it has been reported that 
corruption has resulted in “quacks” being given licenses to operate 
clinics, resulting in deaths of patients.219  Widespread corruption 
evidenced by diversion of public resources for private use 
adversely affects new investment and economic growth.220  Bribery 
and corruption also discourage new investors from countries with 
corruption problems.221  Petty and grand corruption in Africa has 
made East European countries more attractive foreign investment 
destinations.222  Low foreign investment fails to increase 
employment and therefore negatively impacts the poor by 
depriving them of potential sources of income.223 
Judicial reforms such as those promoted by the Asian 
Development Bank have sought to ensure that foreign investment 
will create employment for the poor.  These reforms, though 
primarily aimed at promoting the rule of law, have resulted “in the 
twin goals of greater responsiveness to a market economy and 
increasing the social access of the poor to public goods and 
services.”224  Examples include projects in Vietnam, Mongolia, the 
                                                     
217 Terracino, supra note 1, at 27. 
218 See Graft Messing up Health Services, THE EAST AFRICAN (Nairobi), June 4, 
2007, at 6 (reporting on the many difficulties Uganda has getting health care to its 
poor). 
219 Emmanuel Micah Eldoret, Graft Reigns at Health Ministry, THE STANDARD 
(Nairobi), June 27, 2007, at 8. 
220 Victor E. Dike, Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control 
(2000), http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/gen 
/corruptiondikehtm.html (“Corruption effects investment, economic growth, and 
govern-ment [sic] expenditure choices; it also reduces private investment.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
221 Id. (noting that corruption and other inefficiencies keep investors from 
Nigeria). 
222 Id. (“With the recent changes in the political economy of East Europe, the 
attention of the business world has been turned to this area where they may reap 
quicker results from their investments.”) (emphasis omitted).  
223 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC and Corruption, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2009) (reporting the negative effects of corruption on economic development and 
foreign investments). 
224 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AN OVERVIEW OF ADB’S LAW AND POLICY 
REFORM ACTIVITIES IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents 
/Others/Law_ADB/lpr_2001_Part_1.pdf; see generally ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON 
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South Pacific, Nepal, Philippines and Maldives.  The legal and 
judicial reform in Pakistan for instance, which was done in 
conjunction with the civil society, sought to strengthen systems of 
administrative justice, and increase the use of local languages, 
which it is hoped will allow the poor and marginalized to open the 
door to legal remedies.  Similar judicial reforms in Africa could do 
well to borrow from this experience.  However, as I will show 
below, this has not been the case. 
5.3. Judicial Reform Initiatives Are Designed to Favor the Interests of 
Investors. 
Recognizing that good governance is essential for market 
economy, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the Asian Development Bank have since 1994 “approved or 
initiated more than $500 million in loans for judicial reform 
projects in 26 countries.”225  “Judicial reform is part of a larger 
effort to make the legal systems in developing countries and 
transition economies more market friendly.”226  The broader 
scheme includes “everything from writing or revising commercial 
codes, bankruptcy statutes, and company laws . . . [to] overhauling 
regulatory agencies and teaching justice ministry officials how to 
draft legislation that fosters private investment.”227  The specific 
rationale underlying these projects is to reduce transaction costs for 
investors.228  Transaction costs in the judiciary would be reduced in 
the following ways:  making the judicial branch independent229 by 
                                                                                                                        
PROPOSED LOAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 
FOR THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM, available at http://www.abd.org 
/documents/RRPS/PAL/rrp_32023.pdf (explaining that the goals of the AJP are 
to “improve access to justice so as to . . . sec[ure] and sustain entitlements and 
thereby reduce the poor’s vulnerability . . . and create conditions conducive to 
pro-poor growth”). 
225 See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey 
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999). 
226 Id. at 118. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 120–23 (describing the ways in which increased investment lead to 
economic growth, the goal of the reform). 
229 This is an important suggestion made by many Judicial Reform efforts 
including the Kwach Report.  See KENYA COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 10 (1998) 
(noting that corruption “pervet[s] the course of justice” by causing the delay of 
trials). 
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insulating the selection of the Chief Justice,230 creating an 
evaluation and disciplinary process to prevent improper 
influence231 and allowing judges to control their own budget;232 
speeding the processing of cases by providing management 
training, computers, and other resources to judges and court 
personnel;233 and increasing access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as creating mediation and arbitration services.  
These reforms would in turn reduce case backlogs and accelerate 
the disposition of new disputes thus weeding out delay and 
controlling costs.234 
In this section, I will examine these reforms to strengthen the 
judiciary to enable investors to invest with the lowest possible 
number of restrictions.  My purpose is to show that these reforms 
are not primarily aimed at addressing the problems of corruption 
faced by the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged.  Rather they 
are aimed at promoting the interests of the investors.  In my view, 
these reforms exacerbate the fact that judicial systems across Africa 
were primarily designed to meet the demands of the business class 
rather than to address large-scale issues of poverty and social 
division.  In fact, many governments in post-colonial Africa did 
little or nothing to make the judicial system responsive to broad 
segments of their population.  Reforms to strengthen judiciaries at 
                                                     
230  This is, and always has been, an issue in Kenya as the President has long 
been responsible for the selection of the Chief Justice, which led to very 
unexpected and arguably unqualified appointments of Chief Justices such as 
Chief Justice Chunga, who, it would seem, was not selected to the position based 
on the merits of his resume.  See JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT, ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
REFORM IN KENYA 1998–2003 57 (Ben Sihanya & Philip Kichana eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA, 1998-2003] (recounting the appointment of 
Chief Justice Chunga). 
231 This has also been an issue in Kenya in the past.  There have recently been 
more judicial reports such as the Ringera Report which published the names of 
Justices who appear to be corrupt.  However, even these widely approved reports 
have been questioned to an extent because they were created, in part, by people 
who were judges themselves and who therefore may have been in a position to 
protect themselves or others close to them.  Id. at 61–64. 
232 KENYA COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 229, at 38–
39. 
233 Id. at 29. 
234 Kenya’s intention to remedy these problems can be seen in part through 
the implementation of some of the measures suggested to it by the Kwach Report 
including the reorganization of the courts to create Commercial Court, Family 
Court, etc. and the creation of more Magistrate’s Courts in rural areas.  Both of 
these helped to improve the speed and delivery of justice to the Kenyan people.  
See JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT, supra note 230. 
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the moment are not primarily targeted towards making the legal 
system broadly accessible and affordable for all, but mostly for 
business interests.  In my analysis, I will select a few illustrative 
examples. 
Economists have developed a hypothesis used to affirm the 
judiciary’s effect in enabling exchanges between private parties.  
Thomas Hobbes argued that a judicial system was necessary to 
assure traders that their contracts would be honored.235  Twentieth 
century economists have supported this with evidence to support 
the argument that the absence of a judicial system results in high 
transaction cost for those involved in business.236  Reformers give 
the example of Ghana as a country in which the judiciary is unable 
to enforce contractual obligations and businesses therefore have to 
rely upon “a network of traders to serve as go-betweens.”237  In this 
context, personal relationships provide the buyer and the seller 
with some assurance that the goods will be delivered and payment 
received.  Economists argue that this comes with a price:  the costs 
of doing business are subsequently increased by the creation of 
intermediaries.238 
A broader hypothesis posits that market performance depends 
upon a judicial or legal system in which contracts between private 
parties are enforced and the property rights of foreign and 
domestic investors are respected.  The government in turn operates 
within a known framework of rules in which the judiciary occupies 
a unique position by holding the executive and legislative branches 
accountable for their decisions to ensure the credibility of the 
overall business and political environment thereby supporting 
economic growth. 
Today, the majority of developing countries and former 
socialist states are receiving some type of assistance from 
international organizations such as the U.N. and the World Bank to 
undertake projects to help reform courts, prosecutors’ offices and 
other institutions that together constitute the judicial system.  A 
significant and common objective of these projects is to ensure 
investors to enforce their rights at the lowest cost and within the 
                                                     
235 See Messick, supra, note 225, at 120. 
236 Id. (reviewing contemporary research on Hobbes’ hypothesis). 
237 Id. 
238 For a critical view of this view in the East Asian context, see John 
Onhesorge, ‘Ratch’eting up the Anti-Corruption Drive: Could a Look at Recent History 
Cure a Case of Theory-Determinism?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 467 (1999). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
190 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
 
shortest duration of time.  Thus, a primary aim of judicial and legal 
reform in Sierra Leone is the creation of an enabling environment 
for private sector investment. 239  Proceeding from the premise that 
inadequacies in publicly provided judicial and legal services for 
private sector transactions bring about costs and risks to private 
investors and are thus a disincentive to private investment, the 
government specifically made it an objective to reduce costs to 
private investors in part by protecting their property rights, 
enforcing contracts and enhancing their ability to obtain 
information on legislation.240  In particular, its reform initiatives 
include establishing an institutional process for legislative review, 
developing a core work program for revising business and 
commercial law, and enabling the cost-effective functioning of the 
judiciary and the Department of Judicial Affairs.  The project aims 
at addressing the three sets of constraints that have been identified 
as adversely affecting the quality, timeliness and cost-effectiveness 
of judicial and legal services, namely:  inadequacy of the law, 
implementation of the law, and court infrastructure.  The project 
puts as its priority the legislative reform of business and 
commerce, particularly to update and revise pertinent laws and 
regulations governing business and commerce through the joint 
efforts of the Law Reform Commission, Law Revision Committee, 
and Law Reporting Council. 
The Financial and Legal Management upgrading project 
introduced by the World Bank in Tanzania is another example.241  
The Tanzanian government has undertaken to ensure that 
investors conduct business in the least costly manner.242  The 
objective of this project is “to strengthen the institutional and 
                                                     
239 See Minneh Kane et al., Sierra Leone-Legal and Judicial Sector Assistance 30 
(The World Bank, Working Paper No. 32146, 2004), available at                          
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP 
/IB/2005/04/27/000090341_20050427151735/Rendered/PDF/321460SL0Legal01
0judicial0assessment.pdf (“There is virtual unanimity among Sierra Leoneans that 
building confidence in the justice sector is an essential requirement of economic 
investment and growth, and hence for reviving opportunities for economic 
progress for Sierra Leoneans generally.”). 
240 See JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 1998-2003, supra note 230, at 29 (discussing 
how the role of the judiciary includes not only the protection of human rights, but 
also in the intervention in a vast number of everyday economic disputes so that a 
society’s economy can flourish). 
241 LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUD. 
REFORM 83-84 (7th ed. 2004). 
242 Id. 
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organizational infrastructure of the new open market economy in 
Tanzania that ha[s] emerged since the mid-1980s under the 
[government’s] Economic Recovery Program.”243  The legal 
component of the project has two parts:  (a) building capacity in 
key organizations such as the Judiciary and the Attorney General’s 
Office by providing training, equipment and resources, and (b) 
undertaking a systematic policy review of the key strategic issues 
facing the financial sector over the medium and long-term.244 
Kenya’s Justice and Integrity Project is another such effort.245  A 
new government came into power in Kenya in January 2003 that is 
committed to curbing corruption and developing a reform strategy 
that will provide a justice system that is recognized to be a key 
prerequisite for economic growth.  The Justice and Integrity 
Project’s objective is “to improve the administration of justice and 
enhance the accountability, predictability, integrity and fairness of 
the Judiciary and other institutions in the Justice Sector in 
Kenya.”246  There are seven main components to the proposed 
project.  The first involves reforming the court system by 
introducing simplified proceedings, improving performance 
standards for judicial staff, designing automated recordings of 
court proceedings, enhancing case management, and introducing 
computerized registry document management.  The remaining 
components entail:  
[D]eveloping a comprehensive judicial training program;  
[]trengthening the capacity of the [Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs]; [] developing a comprehensive legal 
education and training program for lawyers and paralegals, 
including establishing a College of Law; [] improving 
access to justice through a capacity building program to 
support the Office of the Public Defender and legal aid 
offices ; []designing a program of law reform to support the 
Government’s strategic plan and the new Constitution; and; 
[] initiating a five year campaign to reduce corruption in 
Kenya.247 
                                                     
243 Id. at 83-84. 
244 Id. at 83 
245 Id. at 20. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 20-21. 
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While the foregoing examples of reform initiatives are 
laudable, 248 especially to the extent they aim to make the judiciary 
fairer, independent, and transparent, they are biased in favor of 
safeguarding the interests of investors.  The rights and issues 
affecting the poor and the working classes are only relevant to the 
extent that they are consistent with the interests of investors. 
5.4. Anti-Corruption and Judicial Reform Initiatives Largely Ignore the 
Poor. 
The judicial reform and anti-corruption projects initiated by the 
World Bank and governments examined in Section 3 mainly focus 
on facilitating market transactions but ignore promoting good 
governance to alleviate poverty.249  Thus, they do not target issues 
of immediate concern for the poor such as when those in power 
take public and private land.250  However, the lack of an 
independent judiciary is also likely to aggregate inequalities and 
worsen poverty.  Where judiciaries and administrative agencies are 
not insulated from the political process, they are more responsive 
to the interests of investors, and income inequalities are likely to be 
aggravated.  After all, independent judiciaries are critical to 
enforcing the rights of poor and marginalized peoples. 
The poor and marginalized groups are also faced with multiple 
obstacles to access legal and judicial services.  The denial of fair 
trial, due process violations, pre-trial detention, intolerable prison 
conditions are just a few obstacles these groups face.251  In Kenya, 
for instance, Amnesty International has raised serious concerns 
about the right to a fair trial.252  There is a dearth of legal services 
available in Magistrate Courts, especially for indigent defendants 
charged with robbery or attempted robbery with violence that face 
a mandatory death sentence if convicted.  Additionally, since legal 
                                                     
248 Developing a comprehensive judicial training program has been an issue 
in Kenya in the past, as the requirements for appointment as a Judge are “bare 
minimum.”  This means that there is no emphasis on academic qualification, and 
a specific amount of work experience is not required for someone as long as he 
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proceedings are conducted in English, defendants who are not 
conversant in English are unable to fully follow the proceedings.  
This problem is particularly acute in cases involving Kenyan 
Somalis in the Eastern Province.  Lack of interpretation 
contravenes Kenya’s Constitution which provides that everyone is 
entitled to have the free assistance of an interpreter paid by the 
state if they cannot understand the language used at trial.  The lack 
of language assistance is particularly troubling because, due to 
congressional legislation, convictions based on confessions are only 
valid if made to a magistrate in open court.253 
Prison conditions in Kenya also affect the poor 
disproportionately.  The conditions are harsh, cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading.254  The circumstances include over-crowding and 
shortages of food, clean water and adequate medical care.  The 
result is high prison mortality rates.  It is estimated that in 1995, 
more than 800 inmates died in the first nine months.  Seventy-five 
percent of the inmates were young and included single mothers 
with children.  The conditions in Kenyan prisons even prompted 
then-President Moi to say “the belief is that any prisoner who 
comes out of the prison alive must be lucky.”255  After visiting 
Lang’ata Women’s Prison, a representative from a human rights 
organization described the conditions there: 
The prison blocs are congested, each cell holds three and 
more people who share a small, torn mattress and tattered, 
old blankets which they use to wrap themselves . . . .  
[Prisoners] are not allowed to wear shoes or slippers 
neither are they provided with anything to cover their feet 
and thus they walk barefooted.  Walking barefooted on this 
filthy ground not only harms their feet but also makes them 
sick with feet diseases and constant colds.256 
The length of pre-trial detention is often beyond the legal limit, 
and detainees are held for periods that exceed the maximum 
period permitted by law.  Police have sought to justify unlawfully 
prolonged detention on the grounds that it is necessary to enable 
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them to carry out their investigations.  Courts rarely challenge 
extended incarceration prior to trial.  Habeas corpus actions are 
costly and open only to those who can afford a lawyer.257 
Inadequate time and facilities for trial preparation are problems 
faced particularly by indigent defendants.  When criminal cases 
come to trial, prosecuting authorities usually provide little or no 
advance disclosure of the prosecution’s evidence or which 
witnesses will testify at trial.  The defense is usually shown the 
original hand-written statement of the witness at trial only in time 
for use in cross-examination.  The defense cannot retain or 
photocopy the statement, making it difficult to challenge the 
witness’ testimony.  To compound these problems, the official 
court records of the trial proceedings are often inaccurate, and 
copies of such record are usually not available until 18 months 
after the termination of the proceeding, rendering appeals almost 
impossible.258   
The judiciary may be reluctant to review the conduct of high- 
placed government officials when such conduct is inimical to the 
interests of poor and marginalized citizens.  For instance, a corrupt 
minister leased substantial portions of an indigenous population’s 
territory to a private company interested in exploring for oil.  The 
population had lived, hunted, trapped and fished in the territory 
since time immemorial.  The right of the group not to be deprived 
of their means of subsistence was substantially affected yet Kenyan 
courts declined to intervene on the group’s behalf.259  The Kenyan 
judiciary has also shown reluctance in issuing injunctions when the 
government failed to take adequate steps to protect a community 
from radioactive exposure.260  There are also frequent reports of 
large-scale evictions and demolitions of informal settlements in 
many Africa cities including one most recently in Zimbabwe.  
Often the pavement and slum dwellers are evicted to enable a 
private entrepreneur to construct a shopping complex in the 
vicinity, thereby depriving poor people who had migrated to the 
city in search of employment of their informal settlement. 
                                                     
257 Id. at 12. 
258 Id. at 12-13. 
259 Nihal Janyawickrama, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights?, 9 E. EUR. 
HUM. RTS. REV. 127, 135 (2003) (noting hypothetical examples based on actual case 
law or reported events in Kenya). 
260 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/3
2009] HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION 195 
 
Uganda’s first National Integrity Survey, conducted by the 
Inspectorate of Government, also highlights judicial corruption.  
The survey found that bribery is most common with police and 
judiciary services, where two-thirds of users pay bribes to the 
workers in the police department and half the users pay bribes to 
workers in the judiciary services.261  Kenya’s police and traffic 
officers are notoriously corrupt as well.  It has been estimated that 
the traffic cops in Nairobi receive three million Kenyan Shillings 
every day in bribes from people trying to avoid arrest or detention 
for small or even nonexistent traffic infractions.262  About half the 
service workers interviewed think that gifts from private 
companies to public sector employees are acceptable, and nearly 
half think that people reporting corruption are likely to suffer for 
it.263   
5.5. Conclusion. 
Anti-corruption and judicial reform initiatives impact the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged in African countries.  The 
initiatives are primarily aimed at making it easier for investors to 
do business rather than addressing the problems of corruption, 
lack of judicial independence, and inadequate trial-preparation 
resources that face the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. 
As a result, reforms to address corruption and judicial 
enforcement of contracts should be complemented by 
simultaneous efforts to address the problems confronted by the 
poor and the disadvantaged.  In the 1980s, good governance 
reforms sought to address issues affecting the poor separately 
under the rubric of social safety nets.  Since the late 1990s, second 
generation good governance reforms, such as the anti-corruption 
and judicial initiatives, have been justified as attacking poverty by 
promoting market reforms that would in turn promote economic 
growth.  Under this conception, issues facing the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged are indirectly, but positively, 
supported by judicial and anti-corruption reforms to the extent 
that increased investment results in more employment for them.  
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However, even assuming that anti-corruption and judicial reforms 
do actually achieve their objectives, these reforms can hardly 
guarantee increased investment.  Infrastructure spending on roads, 
hospitals and schools are critical to providing the kind of social 
capital necessary to meet the basic needs of those living in poverty 
while helping private investors to focus on managing services, as 
recent research now definitively shows.264 
By reframing issues related to social division and hierarchy in 
market terms, anti-corruption and judicial reforms foreclose 
addressing questions of inequality and injustice directly through 
social spending.  Inequality and injustice are central to social 
disadvantage, poverty and economic marginalization and are not 
simply the function of regulatory and market failure.  Issues of 
inequality and injustice were traditionally thought of as 
addressable through public spending rather than through the 
trickle down effects of private investment.  As a consequence, a 
fundamental problem with the current approaches to addressing 
the broad array of challenges posed by poverty is that the current 
programs of economic reform are disempowering to, and discredit, 
such public spending.  Ultimately, the interests of the poor and 
marginalized can best be addressed as a central part of a reform 
agenda that includes sensible anti-corruption and judicial reforms.  
It would seem to me that these issues are too important to be left to 
official development programs.  Those who care about suffering 
must take the bull by its horns and struggle with these issues.265 
In practical terms, the model of judicial reform pursued by the 
Asian Development Bank can be thought of as a counterpoint to 
judicial reform programs that have not shown sensitivity to the 
concerns of the poor.  Unlike the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank promotes judicial reforms that are designed not 
only to attract foreign investment but to create employment for the 
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poor as well.  By consciously pursuing the goal of increasing social 
access to public goods and services, the Asian Development’s 
model of judicial reform could serve as a framework for other 
reform programs that bracket out issues of justice within them or 
assume that increased foreign investment will ultimately reach the 
poor.  Ensuring that legal and judicial reforms also benefit the poor 
would require lending institutions to work with civil society 
groups committed to ensuring reforms also serves to strengthen 
the administrative justice system in ways that benefit the poor and 
marginalized.  Example reforms could include ideas aimed at 
implementing a property rights regime that helps the poor to 
secure good title to land and understand judicial proceedings in 
their own language. 
6. CONCLUSIONS: HOW TO REFORM ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES 
TO ADDRESS POVERTY AND SOCIAL DIVISION 
6.1. Overview of Findings 
The relationship between corruption and human rights is only 
beginning to be seriously examined.  Ongoing research argues that 
corruption disables a State from meeting its obligations to respect, 
fulfill, and protect the human rights of its citizens. 
This study has explored two other relationships between 
human rights and corruption.  First, it has shown how 
individualistic and procedural rights have been used to defeat 
investigations and prosecutions of corruption by high-level 
governmental officials.  Second, it has demonstrated how anti-
corruption reforms have primarily targeted the promotion of 
market efficiency while reducing spending for basic needs such as 
health and education to the detriment of the social and economic 
rights of the poor and marginalized.  These findings are significant 
because they show that the relationship between corruption and 
human rights is more complex than simply that corruption 
disables States from meeting their human rights obligations.  
Indeed, human rights initiatives can be used in support of or 
against corruption. 
The thrust of the recommendations made in this study are 
premised on an approach to human rights that offers the 
maximum potential for the democratization of the Kenyan State 
through transformative constitutional and institutional reforms.  
This can be done by expanding human rights concerns to include 
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the social and economic rights of the poor and institutional 
safeguards for minority rights. 
6.2. In the Context of Human Rights in Relation to the Anti-
Corruption Agenda. 
It would be naïve to simply assume that a revamped Bill of 
Rights would, by itself, result in more vigorous prosecutions 
against corruption.  Effective human rights agendas designed to 
combat corruption should be part of a larger project to democratize 
the State by reducing the powers of the presidency in relation to 
the legislature, the judiciary, and civil society.  Potential projects 
should also incorporate reforms that would:  (1) guarantee a truly 
independent and impartial judiciary that is a human rights 
watchdog for all Kenyan citizens; (2) create a Bill of Rights that 
guarantees civil, political, social, and economic rights; and (3) 
protect the rights of children, women, minorities, and the disabled.  
Further, such projects would require a fair land policy that is free 
of corruption and makes land available to all.  This short list of 
constitutional reforms would begin the long road of truly 
democratizing the Kenyan State and would be an antidote to the 
contemporary efforts and jurisprudence that largely contribute to 
corruption. 
Other reforms here would include the amending libel laws as 
well as decentralizing the authority of the Attorney General to 
prosecute and of the Commissioner of Police to investigate.  This 
reform is discussed further in the proceeding proposal for an 
Office of Special Counsel. 
6.3. In the Context of Judicial Reforms as They Relate to the Anti-
Corruption Agenda. 
Earlier in this Article, we saw that anti-corruption and judicial 
reform initiatives have an adverse impact on the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged.  Anti-corruption and judicial 
reforms are primarily aimed at making it easier for investors to do 
business and are not designed to address the problems of 
corruption, lack of judicial independence and resources to prepare 
for trial, and lengthy pretrial detention periods faced by the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged. 
In practical terms, the model of judicial reform pursued by the 
Asian Development Bank can be thought of as a counterpoint to 
judicial reform programs that have not shown sensitivity to the 
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concerns of the poor.  Unlike the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank has sought to promote judicial reforms that are 
designed not simply to attract foreign investment but to create 
employment for the poor as well.  By consciously pursuing the 
goal of increasing social access to public goods and services, the 
Asian Development’s model of judicial reform could very well 
inform other reform programs that bracket out issues of justice 
within them or that presuppose that increased foreign investment 
will ultimately reach the poor.  Ensuring that legal and judicial 
reforms also benefit the poor would require lending institutions to 
work with civil society groups that are committed to ensuring that 
these reforms also serve to strengthen the systems of 
administrative justice in ways that benefit the poor and 
marginalized.  Examples here could include reforms aimed at 
implementing property rights regime that would help the poor 
secure good title to land understood judicial proceedings in their 
own languages. 
6.4. Office of Special Counsel 
I propose the establishment of an independent investigatory 
and prosecutorial office for grand corruption.  An Office of Special 
Counsel would be constitutionally created and have the security of 
tenure.  It would be empowered to investigate and prosecute 
grand corruption among members of the cabinet and other high 
level officers of government. 
The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission can continue to 
investigate and prosecute all other cases of corruption.  That would 
free the Attorney General to prosecute and independently 
investigate all other categories of corruption cases particularly 
those that directly affect ordinary Kenyans, including those 
involving the Local Authority Transfer Fund as well as the 
Constituency Development Fund.  These Funds are intended to 
have a direct and local impact on the lives of people throughout 
the country but they have not received nearly the kind of scrutiny 
for corruption that is warranted. 
In addition, Kenya could establish an independent anti-
corruption body similar to the ICAC, which was—and continues to 
be—very effective in Hong Kong.266  An independent anti-
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corruption body has proven to be more effective in combating 
corruption for several reasons.267  First, being independent from 
governmental interference allows it to pursue anti-corruption 
matters faster and more efficiently without bureaucratic 
interference.268  Additionally, it is likely that an independent 
commission will be more effective in dealing with corruption 
because it is less likely to contain members of the corrupt 
government.  Finally, in Kenya, a country where corruption has 
become nearly ubiquitous, an independent corruption agency will 
help to restore the Kenyan people’s faith in their government and a 
desire to truly fight corruption.269  Further, an independent agency 
will give people more faith in its anti-corruption programs270 
because they will know that it is not a part of the Kenyan 
government, which has been corrupt since its inception. 
6.5. Parliamentary Control of Public Finance 
Although Parliament has a constitutional duty to oversee the 
government’s budgetary proposals on taxation and expenditure, 
the thirteenth Parliament (2003-2007), like many before it, rarely 
debated or scrutinized budget proposals for an overwhelming 
number of government ministries.271  In effect, government 
ministries spent their budgets with little or no oversight by 
Parliament.  This included over 38.4 billion Kenyan Shillings 
allocated to the Ministry of Finance and over 19 billion to the 
Ministry of Defense.  It is primarily from these two ministries that 
billions were paid to phantom companies in the Anglo-Leasing 
and related scandals of the Kibaki government.  The Watchdog 
committees of the House, the Public Investments, and Public 
Accounts Committee also failed to vigorously exercise their 
oversight functions272 giving ministries a free hand to spend 
                                                                                                                        
Corruption to address the problem of corruption of the Anti–corruption Office o-f 
the Police). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 485–86. 
270 Id. 
271 MARS GROUP KENYA, THE CASE AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE 9TH 
PARLIAMENT: A CRITIQUE OF THE 9TH PARLIAMENT OF KENYA 2003–2007 (2007), 
available at http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/publications/pubs/9th 
_parliament1.pdf. 
272 See id. at 19 (stating that not only have they failed to vigorously oversee the 
spending, but they have fallen behind schedule by at least four years making any 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/3
2009] HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION 201 
 
without accountability.  Parliament must therefore assert its 
traditional role of assuring effective oversight over government 
expenditure.273 
6.6. Individuals with Integrity 
It is often argued that discretion in the hands of bureaucrats 
creates room for corrupt behavior.  While there is a truism in this 
logic, the reverse is not true—that clear and unambiguous rules 
create less room for corrupt behavior.  Building institutions with 
integrity requires having individuals with integrity.274  The case of 
former Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics 
demonstrates that there are Kenyans with integrity willing and 
ready to serve in the government to end corruption.  Integrity will 
also be important not only within the anti-corruption institutions 
engaged in observation, prevention, investigation, and 
prosecution, but in the judiciary as well.  As the Ringera report and 
the subsequent purge of several judges demonstrated, the judiciary 
has been rife with corruption. 
6.7. Pre-Investment Screening of Sales of Public Assets 
Parliament should pass a law requiring pre-investment 
screening of all sales of public assets.  This means that every time 
public assets are up for sale, government officials responsible for 
approving the sale would be duty bound to require bidders to fully 
disclose their identities.  Thus, if a foreign or locally incorporated 
entity enters a bid for the disposal of public assets, its shareholders 
(either natural persons or corporate entities) would have to be fully 
disclosed prior to the execution of the sale.  If shareholders are 
businesses, the new law would at least require the full identity of 
the chief executive officers of the parent company be fully 
disclosed.  A picture of such a person would not suffice for this 
purpose.  Instead, a valid passport or other government-issued 
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document positively identifying such persons would be the only 
acceptable proof of identity. 
In addition, the certificate of incorporation of the entity as well 
as the last two years worth of corporate returns in its country of 
incorporation would be necessary.  Furthermore, all government 
officers approving the sale would have to sign off that they 
satisfactorily ascertained the identities of any entity or person to 
whom a sale of public property was made.  Failure to comply with 
such disclosure would be a punishable offense for officials 
approving the sale.  In fact, I would go even further and propose 
that if such due diligence in positively identifying buyers of public 
property is not made and a sale nevertheless proceeds, such failure 
would make the contract void and unenforceable even if payment 
had been made.275 
7. FINAL WORD 
This study has extensively explored the relationship between 
human rights and corruption.  It has concluded with a series of 
proposed reforms informed by this discussion.  This study 
achieves one important result:  it shows that by categorizing the 
anti-corruption agenda as a human rights issue, the 
democratization of a country’s political, economic and social fabric 
makes it more attentive and responsive to the rights of the most 
marginalized segments of society.  After all, corruption evidences 
abuse of the public trust for private gain.  Previously, the anti-
corruption agenda has been thought of almost exclusively in 
economic terms; to the extent human rights and corruption have 
been a focus, it has been to examine how corruption disables states 
from meeting their human rights obligations.  However, as this 
study has demonstrated, rights have also been used to shield 
powerful politicians from being investigated and prosecuted for 
corruption. As such, a primary contention made in this study is 
that the anti-corruption agenda is also a struggle in transforming 
and democratizing a country’s social, political and economic life by 
making it more attentive and responsive of the rights of the poorest 
and most vulnerable.  This study has begun the contextual analysis 
of the relationship between corruption and human rights and has 
shown the potential for further work in this area. 
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